THE EASTERN QUESTION AND ITS SOLUTION

MORRIS JASTROW, JR.

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THE EASTERN QUESTION AND ITS SOLUTION

BY

MORRIS JASTROW, Jr., Ph.D., LL.D.

PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
AUTHOR OF "THE WAR AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY," "THE WAR AND THE COMING PEACE," ETC., ETC.

WITH A MAP OF THE NEAR EAST

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TO

AGNES REPPLIER

AS A TRIBUTE OF FRIENDSHIP

PREFACE

THIS book is an outgrowth of two articles on "Is the Near-Eastern Question Capable of Solution?" which I contributed to the *New York Sun* of December 7th and 14th, 1919. In the enlargement I have had particularly in mind to set forth our interest as Americans in a question of world-wide significance that lay at the root of the war in which we became involved. The Eastern Question will continue to be a menace to the peace of the world until it is rightly settled, as it has been such a menace for over a century. It is therefore a matter of vital concern to us to see to its settlement. If the world continues to be in a disturbed and restless condition, we will suffer along with European nations. Besides this selfish point of view, we also have an interest of a higher character in the lands that have now been released from Turkish sovereignty, by virtue of our large participation in educational

work in the Near East for more than half a century, as also because of our intense sympathy with Armenia which has suffered so frightfully during the war. Then, too, a country like Palestine makes an appeal to us, as it does to the entire world because of its historic and sacred associations, and one may also urge our human sympathy with all the peoples of the Near East that have languished for centuries under the awful conditions produced by neglect and misrule. Finally, our commercial relations with the Near East challenge our concern for the future welfare of that region.

At the same time, I share, to a large extent, the strong feeling in this country against our assuming a mandate over any part of the Near East, whether it be for Armenia or for Armenia and Turkish Asia Minor; and I do so, despite the recognition of the correct principle of responsible trusteeship underlying mandates, because our national traditions warn us to caution against becoming involved

in political complications not of our making, and because mandates in the form in which they have been proposed involve sending a considerable army across the ocean for an indefinite time, and with the possible sacrifice of American lives. If, however, American help can be extended towards the resuscitation of the East, which is the very core of the problem involved in the Eastern Question, without the danger of entangling alliances, and without the necessity of keeping a large army of occupation on the spot, it ought not to be refused; and I believe that public opinion under these circumstances will favor extending whatever help can be given. With this in view, I have tried in the last chapter of this book—and this is my main purpose in writing it—to set forth a plan for the solution of the Eastern Question that embodies the idea of guidance and trusteeship, but without the objections to be urged against entrusting each subdivision of the Near East to a *single* mandatory power, and without

the dangers inherent in such a distribution. My plan, to which I have been led by a prolonged study of the ancient and modern East, proposes to utilize the spirit of international coöperation which won the war, by applying that spirit to the situation that confronts us after the war in the Near-Eastern lands, in Turkish Asia Minor, in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbeijan, in Syria and Palestine, in Arabia and Mesopotamia, all of which need now to be reorganized and reconstructed.

It was not possible within the compass of a small book to develop the details of the plan; nor is this necessary at the present time. I regarded it as more important to lead up to the solution by setting forth the reasons for the failure of what I call the traditional diplomatic policy of the European Powers towards the East, and to show how the present muddle is a result of the attempt made during the war, by secret treaties and by official declarations, to continue that policy.

I have no illusions of proposing a solution that can be carried out rapidly. Time, patience and tact will be required, for it is no simple task that confronts us to undo the work of centuries and to clear the ground for building up a new East, with the ultimate goal of making the population capable of self-government and organized into a series of independent states. But it is a task well worth doing and, what is more, a task that needs to be done if we are not to lose the fruits of the hard-earned victory after a struggle of four years and more, and I am convinced also that it cannot be done without America's moral support and direct help. Whatever may be thought of the plan by those who have given the subject the study necessary to make their opinion of value, I feel tolerably certain that the basic principle of international coöperation upon which the plan rests is the only hope of reaching a genuine solution of the perplexing Eastern Question. Through such coöperation, resus-

citation of the East will replace the exploitation that has been the fatal mistake of the past. Eastern peoples need to be educated to stand on their own feet, in order that the East may again make its contributions to civilization as it did in the days of antiquity and, indeed, continued to do until it was blighted and devitalized through political misrule and economic neglect.

As this book goes to press the supplementary conference to take up the treaty with Turkey and to deal with the disposition to be made of the Near East is carrying on its deliberations. There is little hope that the conference will lead to a definite solution. The most that one can expect is a temporary adjustment of the complicated situation that may secure the appearance of tranquility for a limited period. Unfortunately, neither Great Britain nor France—the two most potent influences at the conference—appears to be ready to deal with the Near East in a direct spirit and without making ulterior po-

litical considerations and economic interests the guiding factor. These interests have their due place, but when they are pressed to the point of obscuring the *real* problem involved in the Near East and of keeping out of view the goal to be kept in mind in a possible solution of the Eastern Question, then economic interests as well as political motives become obstacles in the way of progress. I shall be more than content if my presentation of the Near Eastern Question and of the solution proposed may be of some avail in calling attention to the direction towards which we should be moving and of emphasizing the necessity of turning in that direction. Eventually—of that I feel certain—the necessity of approaching the Eastern Question in the spirit of international coöperation, as set forth in the last chapter, will be recognized. But it may be that we will have to look forward to another international conflict before that happy day dawns. Let us hope not, but hope alone will

not avail to prevent further complications from arising, such as dragged out the process of the resuscitation of nationalities in the Balkan States for over a century. Such complications will assuredly arise unless America, to which the Near East looks appealingly for help, continues in the arena to fight for the triumph of the spirit of international coöperation in dealing with the Eastern Question. We entered that arena at the Paris Conference, which, whatever its shortcomings, *was* dominated, as I try to show, by the spirit of international coöperation—that same spirit which won the war and for which President Wilson stood during his presence in Paris. If we step out now, the Near East, after being rescued from the Turkish yoke, will be left to the mercy of the diplomatic bickerings and bargainings of European Powers, with only this difference from the situation at the outbreak of war, that Germany, Austria and Russia will be out of the game, and Italy and Greece in it

as new participants, by the side of Great Britain and France. The Eastern Question cannot be solved without American participation, for the reason that we have no other interest in the situation except ultimately to make the East independent.

It remains for me to acknowledge the courtesy of the The Denoyer-Geppert Co., of Chicago, for their kind permission to make partial use of the excellent map "Europe After the Great War" (published by them in their Harding European History Series) in order to show the boundaries of the Balkan States as determined by the Peace Conference. I wish, also, to make acknowledgment, as in the case of all my writings, to my wife, with whom I have talked over the subject frequently, and whose sympathetic interest has clarified my mind on many points in the treatment of the theme. She has, as usual, read a proof with her practiced eye and keen discernment.

PHILADELPHIA, FEBRUARY, 1920

MORRIS JASTROW, JR.

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THE EASTERN QUESTION AND ITS SOLUTION

CHAPTER I

The Failure of European Diplomacy in the Near East

The war is not over, nor will it be until the Eastern Question has been disposed of. The adjournment of the Paris Conference, and the announcement that a special conference is to be called to take up the disposition to be made of what was once the Turkish Empire, justifies the suspicion that the many conversations that must have been held on the subject during the past year among the representatives of the great powers only revealed the difficulties in the situation, but no solution. Various reasons have been assigned for the postponement of the consideration of the Eastern Question, among

which the necessity of waiting until the peace treaty has been ratified in some acceptable form by the United States Senate may have been the most cogent, for it is a fact confirmed by competent observers and by students of European affairs, that the nations of Europe are at present looking to American participation to help the world over the serious crisis through which it is passing. This feeling is shared also by the nationalities of the Near East—Armenians, Turks, Greeks, Syrians, Arabs, Georgians, Kurds —whose fate hangs in the balance. While the sincerity of this feeling, even on the part of diplomats, always suspected of harboring ulterior motives, need not be questioned, yet in the ultimate analysis the reason why the Paris Conference adjourned after preparing the treaties with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, is to be sought in the complicated situation in the Near East through the continuation during the war of the same diplomatic methods which before

the war had made the Eastern Question a witches' cauldron, to which new inflammatory ingredients were constantly being added:

> "Double, double toil and trouble,
> Fire burn and cauldron bubble."

No student of Eastern affairs can close his eyes to the fact that the Eastern Question, now smoldering, now bursting into flames, has indeed been an instance of "double toil and trouble" ever since the decline of the Turkish Empire, forshadowed by the defeat of the Turkish fleet at Lepanto by Don John, of Austria, in 1571, and which more definitely set in with the signing of the Treaty of Jassy in 1792, which ceded the Crimea to Russia. The Eastern Question has been officially "solved" so often during the past century, through wars and diplomatic negotiations and through international conferences, that even an optimist might be disposed to raise the question whether it is capable of solution. It would have marked a

decided step in advance if the delegates of the Powers assembled in Paris had been willing, frankly, to admit the *impasse* reached in the situation, for by such admission the way at least would have been cleared for approaching the problem from a different angle than that of the traditional European diplomacy.

The Eastern Question has been for more than a century the greatest menace to the peace of the world. In order to judge the problem aright, we must recognize that it was the Eastern Question that brought on two international conflicts, the Crimean War of 1854–6 and the Russian-Balkan-Turkish War of 1876–78. In both of these all the great European Powers were involved, while the second in addition embraced in its scope the Balkan nationalities. The same question was the largest single factor in bringing on the war of 1914. Germany and France might have gone on growling at each other for four more decades, without ever involv-

ing the world in a conflict to settle their difficulties. German officers might have continued indefinitely giving vent to their feelings towards England by drinking their toasts to the "Tag," but without that day ever dawning. The growing economic rivalry between England and Germany would never of itself have issued in a death and life encounter between two mutually exclusive ideas of government, which dragged in the rest of the civilized world. If the Austrian Archduke had permitted himself to be assassinated in Berlin or Vienna in the conventional form of royal murders by an anarchist or by a demented individual, Germany would not have been afforded the opportunity to embroil the world. It was the introduction of the Eastern Question into the murder that gave Germany the chance to egg on Austria and to bait Russia with whom, as the backer of the Slav states of southeastern Europe, a clash of arms at some time was inevitable in order to clear the track for German schemes,

looking to the domination of the Near East. Servia blocked the way of the Berlin to Bagdad Railway, and hence Austria was urged to hold Servia responsible for the murder.

There seems to be a fatality about the Near East in thus perpetually being a disturbing factor threatening the peace of the world. No matter how trivial the cause, or how apparently remote from the larger interests of Europe the immediate reason for the outbreak of hostilities in any section of the Near East may be, an international conflagration of larger or smaller proportions results. Thiers, the French statesman and historian, characterized the Crimean War as one "to give a few monks the key of a grotto." It arose, as should be recalled, over a most trivial dispute about certain privileges claimed by Latin monks in Bethlehem to have access from their building to the sacred manger of Christian tradition. Because the French and the other Catholic Powers of Europe, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Belgium,

Sardinia and Naples, supported the demands of the monks, Russia was aroused to assert the right of Greek Catholics, and a furious blaze of international proportions was the result. It is only necessary to read the details of the diplomatic negotiations between the Powers from a few years before the war to the close of 1856,[1] to realize that the *real* cause of the international conflict was the condition created by the growing weakness of what was once the all-powerful Turkish Empire. That weakness afforded the European powers the opportunity or, if you choose, the temptation to put their clutches on the devitalized East; and that is the gist of the problem that has been disturbing the world for so long a period. Sir Robert Morier, in his Memoirs,[2] declares the Crimean War to have been "the only perfectly useless modern war that has been waged,"

[1] Set forth in detail in Marriott's *Eastern Question*, Chapter 10.

[2] *Memoirs and Letters*, Vol. II, p. 215.

and so it was from one point of view, though from another it was also as inevitable as it was useless. Both England and France subsequently regretted their support of Turkey and completely reversed their attitude, but it is precisely this shifting in the diplomatic policy as the result not of a change of heart nor of the introduction of a new guiding principle, but solely because some ulterior political motive prompts a rearrangement of the pieces on the diplomatic chess-board, that makes the Eastern Question such a plague spot.

The Paris Conference of 1856, upon the termination of the Crimean War, proceeded along the same lines of expediency and compromise as its predecessor in Vienna in 1815 on the termination of the Napoleonic Wars —with this difference, to be sure, that a certain wave of idealism which swept over the world after the downfall of Napoleon and which found expression in a premature scheme for a league of nations, had been suc-

ceeded by a more cynical disposition on the part of the powers of Western Europe in their endeavor to reap benefits from the hoped-for dissolution of the Turkish Empire. The chief results of the conference were the curtailing of Russian influence in the Near East, and the guarantee for the integrity of Turkey on the part of Great Britain, France and Austria, subject to the carrying out of reform measures in the administration of the Empire, of which there was as little likelihood as possible. One real gain in the Conference, heralding the approach of a new era (though its coming was subsequently retarded), was the opening up of the Danube for the commerce of all nations under the control of an international commission which has functioned successfully. The real issue in 1856, which concerned the liberation of the Balkan States from the Turkish yoke, was dodged, and, as a consequence, the Paris Conference of 1856 merely postponed for a time a still greater

conflict that was bound to ensue through the growing restlessness of Roumania, Servia and Bulgaria, anxious to secure for themselves the same political independence which Montenegro had achieved in 1799 and Greece in 1830, after a struggle of several decades. The rise of the suppressed nationalities in the Balkan Peninsula was a *normal result* of the weakening of the Turkish yoke imposed upon this region during the fourteenth to the sixteenth century, and as such should have commanded the sympathetic and whole-souled support of all the European Powers. Instead, however, the traditional European diplomacy invariably intervened whenever a crisis arose. Each of the Powers was more anxious to use the one or the other of the Balkan States as a pawn to help in playing its own game, than to promote a normal development of affairs. The fear of the growing influence of Russia, sponsoring the cause of the Slav States, Servia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, dictated the continuation of Eng-

land's policy to use her influence to maintain the semblance of Turkish sovereignty in southeastern Europe, until the atrocities committed by the Turks in their attacks upon Bulgarian towns and villages in 1876 aroused such indignation as to force a crisis.

Even then Great Britain and France, bound to the shackles of an elusive phantom known as the "Balance of Power," which was one of the legacies of the Conference of 1856, threw their influence on the side of Turkey upon the termination of the Russian-Balkan-Turkish War of 1876–78, because of the great advantages that Russia gained from the Treaty of San Stefano, signed on March 3, 1878. As a matter of fact, this treaty had brought the Balkan situation to the only logical conclusion by recognizing the independence of Servia and Roumania and by the creation of the new state of Bulgaria. With that fatality, however, which is inherent in the traditional method of approaching the Eastern Question, the germs

of future conflicts were permitted to remain. By excluding Bosnia and Herzegovina from the independence granted to the other Balkan nationalities, Turkish sovereignty was maintained in these provinces, though the control was largely nominal, since measures of administrative reform agreed to by the Sultan were this time to be carried out under the supervision of Austria and Russia. This meant that at some time Austria or Russia would seize the two provinces in question. It turned out to be Austria. The Berlin Congress of 1878, which again attempted to "solve" the Eastern muddle, gave Austria the protectorate over Bosnia and Herzegovina. In due time this protectorate, following consistently along the lines of the traditional European diplomacy, led to the incorporation of these two provinces into the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. This took place thirty years later, in 1908.

The convening of the Berlin Congress in June, 1878, within four months after the

signing of the Treaty of San Stefano, is perhaps the most striking illustration of the perplexing nature of the Eastern Question, as it affords the most convincing proof of its world-wide significance, and of its menace to the peace of Europe, as also that the question was incapable of solution through peace conferences, *unless* some new guiding principles could be introduced to replace the two resources upon which alone the traditional diplomatic policy of Europe could fall back —one, the dodging of the issue by an attempt to maintain the balance of power in the Near East among the chief interested parties, Russia, Great Britain, France and Austria, and second, maintaining dissatisfaction among all the resurrected Balkan nationalities by not granting to anyone *all* that she was entitled to. The balance of power was upset by the Treaty of San Stefano, because it gave Russia a predominant position on the Black Sea, with a constant threat of advancing upon Constantinople. To Great

Britain the situation thus created was particularly intolerable, because she had in the interim, while the Balkan nationalities and Russia were fighting the Turks, secured control of the Suez Canal[3] and had strengthened her hold on India by proclaiming Queen Victoria on January 1st, 1877, as Empress of India. It was essential for Great Britain's interest to keep Russia from having control of the outlet to the Ægean and Mediterranean, and she was therefore forced to resume her old rôle of propping up the pillows of the bed on which the "sick man of Europe" lay dying. The failure of the first resource of European policy towards the Near East was counterbalanced by the success of the second, for Servia, Greece and Roumania were thoroughly discontented, because they were excluded from the peace negotiations at San Stefano "with incredible

[3] The announcement was made on November 25, 1875, that the British government had purchased from the Khedive of Egypt his 176,000 shares in the Suez Canal for the sum of four million sterling.

tactlessness," as Marriott pithily puts it,[4] and none had received the full slice of the carved up Turkey to which she felt entitled. Could there be a better proof of the hopelessness of solving the Eastern Question along the traditional diplomatic lines?

For all that the Berlin Congress continued in the same groove as the one of 1856, with the result that it laid the seeds for the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. The formation of a League of the Balkan States through the efforts of the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos after previous endeavors had failed, was a constructive step towards a normal solution of the Balkan phase of the Eastern Question, since its ultimate object was to perfect the process of the rise of the Balkan nationalities by ridding them of what remained of Turkish control in southeastern Europe. Had the European powers kept their hands off, the League would have settled the problem, and what is more, the war

[4] *The Eastern Question*, p. 300.

of 1914–1918 might have been averted, for the Balkan League would have formed a cordon against Germany's advance towards the Near East. The formation of the Balkan League was also the *logical* step, and would probably have led in time to a Federation of Balkan States, which would have been the safest guarantee against petty jealousies arising among the various nationalities of the Balkan peninsula to endanger the existence of all.

The determination of the powers—each from the point of view of its own interests in the East—to preserve what was left of the sovereignty of the Turkish Empire, brought about the rupture of the League after it had succeeded, by the combined efforts of Servia, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Roumania, in capturing Adrianople and in threatening Constantinople. The second resource of the traditional European policy in arousing the dissatisfaction of the Balkan States once more proved success-

ful, and the States began an intrafraternal warfare which was disastrous not so much in its immediate results, as in reinflaming intense hostility between Greece and Bulgaria, both eager to obtain control of Macedonia, with Servia, while siding with Greece, eyeing the assumptions of both with suspicion. The first Balkan War of 1912 of the combined states against Turkey was followed by a second one in 1913 among the States themselves; and this time by a diplomatic shift on the chessboard, Turkey sided with Servia and Greece against Bulgaria, and by regaining Adrianople saved herself from the fate which a year before seemed imminent. The significant outcome of the two wars was the creation of the independent state of Albania, the last of the suppressed nationalities to regain its liberty, and the division of Macedonia between Servia, Greece and Montenegro.[5] Bulgaria was crushed, and in her humiliation

[5] Servia obtained central Macedonia; Montenegro the western half; Greece southern Macedonia, as well as Epirus.

threw herself into the arms of Germany, which since 1889 had appeared on the scene as a new disturbing factor in the Near East, destined to bring on the greatest crisis of all and leading to the present aspect of the Near Eastern problem. It is one of the natural consequences of the traditional European policy towards the East that no sooner is one aspect of the problem disposed of, than a new factor springs up and produces a more perplexing situation.

Until the advent of William II to the throne of Germany in 1888 that country had shown little interest in the Near East, except that as one of the great powers she had participated in the constant interference in the process of dissolution of the Turkish Empire, now backing Austria and opposing Russia, while at other times in league with Russia. Germany's commercial interests in the East had not yet reached a point which suggested governmental backing. She had no domain in Northern Africa, over which to exercise

a protectorate; she had no possessions in the distant East. But Germany could not resist the temptation to be drawn into the whirlpool of territorial expansion, and accordingly Berlin fell in with the game of Great Britain and France, and in the early 80's launched the policy of German colonization in South Africa. The appearance of the German Emperor at Constantinople in 1898 marked the definite entrance of Germany into the affairs of the Near East, though as far back as 1848 the German economist Roscher had suggested that in the division of the Turkish Empire Asia Minor would be the natural share of Germany, and in 1888 a Society was formed in Berlin with a large capitalization, to promote German penetration into Asia Minor. It was not, however, until 1903 that a definite project for such penetration was launched through the several steps taken for the construction of a railway from Constantinople to Bagdad under a most

favorable concession granted by the Turkish Government.[6]

As the Railway project progressed, it was foreseen that it would become the most formidable weapon in bringing about German supremacy throughout the Near East. Behind the railway stood the most efficient and most powerful military organization of Europe. With a continuous route from Berlin to Bagdad under German control, the Balkans and Asia Minor would be at the mercy of that organization in case of a conflict, while Germany's presence at the head of the Persian Gulf would be a menace to Great Britain's possessions in India. The new factor that thus assumed a serious aspect at the time when the Balkan situation was approaching its final stage through the cutting off of *all* the Balkan States from Turkish domination, furnishes a further illustration of the hopelessness of ever solving the Eastern Question

[6] See for detail the author's *The War and the Bagdad Railway*, Chapter III.

by the continuation of the traditional European policy to utilize the weakness of the East, incident to the gradual dissolution of the Turkish Empire, for territorial and political control of Eastern lands. The Bagdad Railway project represents the natural culmination of the efforts which began with Napoleon's attack on Egypt, and led in a progressive advance during the 19th Century to France's absorption of Algiers and Tunis—together with a more recent extension into Morocco; to England's steadily increasing control of Egypt, until at the beginning of the recent war a formal protectorate, involving—at least for the time being—complete domination, was declared; and to Italy's seizure of Tripoli in 1912. These successive steps through which the Northern Coast of Africa fell into the hands of European powers are illustrative of the adroitness with which, more particularly, Great Britain and France availed themselves of every crisis to strengthen their hold on

foreign possessions, as also of their recognition of the responsibility which the new conditions entailed. For we must recognize that the seizure of Algiers in 1830 by France meant the reorganization of an inefficient administration into a system, the results of which soon manifested themselves in improved conditions of the people and in a growing prosperity. Similarly, when England appeared on the scene, and after a period of rivalry with France, fixed in 1894 upon Egypt as her sphere of control, she began an even more remarkable work of reconstruction and resuscitation. Lord Cromer's account of his brilliant administration of Egypt for 20 years is profoundly impressive, and shows the possibilities of a genuine restoration of the East through the introduction of the progressive Western spirit. For all that, the exploitation of the exhausted East is necessarily involved in such a policy as was pursued by France and Great Britain, and this exploitation is the very core of the

Eastern question in North Africa, just as the intervention of European powers in the Balkan peninsula and the ambitious plan of Germany to gain a complete mastery of the East, are further manifestations of this policy of exploitation in the two other regions. The fatal objection to the traditional European diplomacy lies precisely in its inability to lead to a permanent solution. It has failed in the past; it is bound to fail if it should again be tried, for failure is inherent in a policy that rests on a wrong principle.

The liberal policy of Great Britain towards Egypt in gradually educating the natives to self-government, instead of reaping a harvest of gratitude, produces discontent through the rise of the spirit of national self-consciousness. Witness the present disturbed condition in Egypt, which suggests the probability that France will some day encounter the same perplexities in her North African protectorate. The only rational solution for all phases of the Eastern ques-

tion, is the one which despite European intervention was being worked out in the Balkan States through their reconstruction as entirely independent principalities. That process as a result of the recent war is now practically complete, but when one thinks of the waste of human lives and the bitter struggles of more than a century entailed in bringing about this solution, one realizes the dreadful cost that the failure of the diplomatic policy of Europe towards the East has entailed.

The normal course of events would have led at least half a century ago to the combination of the Balkan nationalities for the restoration of their independence from the Turkish Empire, which by the beginning of the nineteenth century had plainly run its course; and while disputes would probably have arisen among the States in the settlement of boundaries, because of the flow of population in the course of centuries, these disputes would never have occasioned the international conflicts of 1854, of 1876, and of

1914. The traditional European diplomacy is thus the supplementary factor to the steadily growing weakness of the Turkish Empire, that creates the Eastern Question and makes it the constant menace to the peace of the world that it has been for so many decades. That menace will continue until all phases of the Eastern Question shall have been settled along the lines of the final settlement of the Balkan phase. The entire world —we in this country as well as every other section of Western civilization—is vitally interested in seeing to it that the mistakes of the past are not about to be repeated.

The remoteness of Turkish possessions in Northern Africa from the capital of the Empire and the lack of a large Turkish navy made the struggle in this section less intense, and the intervention of the European Powers a far easier procedure. But there was at least one period when, if Mohammed Ali's plans had not been thwarted by one of the most intricate series of diplomatic nego-

tiations and intrigue, and by a constant shifting in the kaleidoscopic combination of European powers, now some combining against Turkey, and again the same group combining for Turkey, Egypt as well as the adjoining Palestine and Syria would have been liberated from the Turkish yoke half a century ago, to enter upon an era of reconstruction as independent states. This was between 1805–1841, when this energetic and remarkable personality held the center of the stage in the Near East.[7] Availing himself of European military science in organizing the Egyptian army and in rebuilding the navy, he also laid the foundation of the economic restoration of Egypt, which despite his errors and his often cruel methods, might have been accomplished had it not been for the mistaken policy of Europe, which here as in the Balkan States invariably came to the support of the impaired Turkish sov-

[7] See Marriott's *Eastern Question*, pp. 202–218, for the interesting story of Mohammed Ali's career.

ereignty, *just* at the moment when its disappearance was imminent. Through this interference a respite was granted to the dying Turkish Empire long enough to wear out Mohammed Ali, who was finally forced to yield to overwhelming odds against him; and the way was cleared for English, French and, later, Italian control of Northern Africa.

It will thus be seen that, whether we turn to the Balkan phase of the Eastern Question or to the aspect that it presents in North Africa, the problem is the same, arising out of the slow process of the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, which stirred up the ambitions of European powers for territorial and political expansion in order to become the heirs of Turkish sovereignty, or led to a form of intervention that necessarily retarded the normal solution and created new conflicts.

There is, to be sure, another and perhaps deeper aspect to the Eastern Question. The East has always proved a magnet to the

West, just as at other times the control of the West has been the ambition of the East. No sooner was Alexander the Great secure in his possession of the Grecian mainland than his eyes were turned to the East, at the time languishing after giving to the world the great Egyptian and Babylonian civilizations, with their offshoots in Crete and Asia Minor. Rome was compelled almost against her will to become a great Eastern Empire, as well as mistress of the West. The Arabs reversed this position in the seventh century of this era and overran the West, while with the taking of Constantinople in 1453 by the Osmanli Turks, the process of Eastern domination of the West reaches its culmination. What we are, therefore, witnessing since the close of the eighteenth century is the return wave, marking the attempt of the West to control the East. This larger aspect of the question must be kept in view when we come to consider the possibility of a definite solution of the ancient question in its latest aspect,

for it suggests that the East at present not only stands in need of the West, but that it cannot be reconstructed and restored to its former position without the assistance of the West. The "trend towards the East" is the sign under which history is moving in our days and has been moving for over a century. Western penetration into the East is inevitable, but it does not follow that this penetration which means the introduction of Western methods of government, Western commerce, Western principles of education and the like need be of a forcible character. The assistance that the East needs in order to recover from its present languishing condition, due to Turkish misrule and neglect, can be rendered just as effectively and indeed more so, if it can take on the form of coöperation with the East instead of exploitation.[8] The result of exploitation, despite the benefits conferred upon such countries as

[8] See further on this the author's *The War and the Bagdad Railway*, pages 243–52.

Algiers, Tunis and Egypt and to a lesser, though still considerable extent upon Palestine, Syria and parts of Asia Minor, is to be seen in the constant rise of new factors striving for control, in the creation of new and more complicated aspects of the problem even after some phase of it has been disposed of, and in the perpetual fomenting of quarrels which, arising within a restricted area, have a fatal tendency to swell into international proportions. Until the latest aspect of the Eastern Question as presented upon the termination of the war has been solved in a satisfactory manner, the world will continue to be in a condition of unsettled peace, and such a condition necessarily borders on perpetual war.

CHAPTER II

The Present Situation

A year after the armistice the world is still confronted with the Eastern Question that brought on the crisis. It is the same question, as we have seen, that has been before it in one form or the other ever since Napoleon, at the close of the eighteenth century by his Egyptian and Palestinian campaigns, made it evident that the process of dissolution of the once mighty Turkish Empire had definitely set in. The decision on the Western front in 1918 removed the menace of Prussian militarism and of German world domination, but it has not settled the issue which lay behind the pan-Germanic scheme for the control of the Near East.

The proposed Conference will represent a third attempt to settle the situation arising out of the prolonged process of the dissolu-

tion of the Turkish Empire, or, if we include the Algeciras Conference of 1906 over the Morocco situation, as representing one phase of the general question, a fourth attempt. Both the Paris Conference of 1856 and the Berlin Congress of 1878 were hailed with considerable enthusiasm as capable of settling the Eastern Question, but they settled nothing, except the certainty of further bloody conflicts over the division of the spoils. No more ominous truth was ever voiced than the judgment of the great philosopher Kant, in his remarkable essay on "Perpetual Peace," written in 1795, that peace treaties made by conferences of diplomats had always contained the seeds for future wars. That applies with special force to agreements reached among powers involving the division of territory to which none has any right. The conferences of 1856 and 1878 were doomed to failure, and the Algeciras Conference merely postponed the war for a few years, because the guiding principle in the case of

all three was false—and a false principle in diplomacy means a wrong principle. Bismarck's striking metaphor in characterizing his rôle at the Berlin Congress as that of an "honest broker" is a frank admission of what the guiding principle was, and one can imagine Bismarck inwardly chuckling at the use of the adjective "honest," as he dealt out his certificates of stock in a bankrupt corporation. If Germany had only taken seriously Bismarck's dictum that "the whole Balkan Question was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian soldier," she might have saved herself her present humiliation and the world untold suffering. The question that confronts the world is, whether the special conference is going to furnish another attempt to solve the Eastern Question by the same methods which led to dismal failure on previous occasions.

Just here is where the interest of our country in the question comes in. Certainly, no one could have predicted at the outbreak of the war in 1914, that the United States would

become involved, and still less that we would be the decisive factor in bringing the conflict to a conclusion. If, as has been shown, the unsolved Eastern Question is a constant menace to the peace of the world, it is clearly within the range of possibility that in case of another conflict we will again be drawn in as into a whirlpool. Each succeeding international conflict over the Eastern Question has been of more serious moment than its predecessors, not only in drawing more victims into its dragnet, but also in keeping all of Europe in a perpetual state of turmoil and unrest through the threatened outbreak of hostilities, now averted for a time through diplomatic negotiations, only to be followed shortly by another crisis. It is safe to say that there has been no single decade since 1815 when there has not been either an actual outbreak of war or a threat of war or an exchange of communications between the European Powers in order to tide over a crisis. Now the crisis makes its appearance in some

Balkan State that affects the interest of all the Balkan nationalities and their European "backers," now in Algiers or in Egypt or in Morocco or in Tripoli, embroiling all the Western Powers that have interests in that region. A third region which has also been involved in international conflicts of the past century, but which in its latest phase comes into enlarged prominence, is Asia Minor, with its subdivisions and outposts—Armenia, Georgia, Azerbeijan, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia. In this region, the United States has special interests no less significant than those of Great Britain and France, for it is due to American initiative and activity that such important educational institutions have been established as Robert College in Constantinople, the Women's College in the same capital and the American University at Beirut. Besides these larger institutions, many smaller schools have been organized through the efforts of American missionaries, and men-

tion should also be made of the various schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Palestine and Asia Minor proper, to the support of which American Jews have largely contributed. These educational efforts have been of profound influence in spreading Western modes of thought as well as Western standards of education throughout the Near East. Thousands of Turks, Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks, Syrians, Arabs, Egyptians and Jews have passed through these schools into business and professional life. Graduates of the American colleges in the Near East fill the most responsible positions in commercial life and in government administration from Constantinople to Bagdad, in Egypt, as well as in Palestine and Syria. This educational work is precisely the kind that is needed to redeem the Near East from the blight of centuries of Turkish misrule, and our larger participation in it in the past imposes upon us an obligation at the present juncture of Eastern affairs from

which we cannot escape, even if we would. We have gone too far into the work to step out. Our commercial interests in the Near East have also grown apace during the past decades, as is attested by the existence of an active American Chamber of Commerce in Constantinople, and the numerous agencies of American firms throughout the Near East.

From various points of view, therefore, we in this country have an interest in seeing to it that the proposed special Conference does not follow along the lines that guided the previous international gatherings called to settle the Eastern Question. It is idle to close our eyes to this danger. If one may judge by the various agreements made by the Allies among themselves and with representatives of Eastern lands during the war, the European powers are still under the delusion that the traditional diplomatic methods can with some modifications be successfully applied to clear up the present situation. As against this, one may with

considerable assurance answer the question whether the Eastern Question is capable of solution with an emphatic negative, *unless* some new guiding principle can be set up that will suggest a way out of an apparently hopeless muddle. Now, exactly what is the present situation? Corresponding to the rapid survey that we gave in the preceding chapter of the failure of the traditional European diplomacy to provide a solution, let us analyze the present stage of the problem by showing what has been done since the outbreak of the war.

The Balkan phase of the Near-Eastern Question may be said to have reached its final settling as a result of the war. The formation of the Jugo-Slav Kingdom has brought together the scattered elements of the Slav people in southeastern Europe. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Croatia and Slovenia, have been united with the Serbs. The natural boundaries of Roumania have been restored. The Macedonian question had

been partially disposed of by the treaty of Bucharest in 1913 after the second Balkan War, and what remained of this question has been settled by the treaty with Bulgaria, if not in an entirely satisfactory manner, at least as equitably as is perhaps possible in view of the mixture of nationalities in this border region. There is, to be sure, still a section of Thrace that has been separated from Bulgaria to be disposed of, but that will not provoke serious difficulties. At all events, after a struggle lasting over a century the last remnant of Turkish sovereignty in the Balkan Peninsula has disappeared with the exception of Constantinople itself and the little circle of territory forming the approach to the metropolis of the Near East. In the second region—Northern Africa—what may be called a provisional completion of the process of separation from Turkish sovereignty was reached through the forcible conquest of Tripoli by Italy in 1912–13; and although, as the present disturbed internal

conditions in Egypt show, further difficulties are to be expected here with the growing national self-consciousness of the peoples now forced to submit to foreign political domination—whether in the form of a protectorate or of actual possession—on the part of European powers, the main aspect of the Eastern Question which will absorb the attention of the supplementary conference has to do with the third region—Asia Minor with its outposts. As a direct result of the war, Georgia is separated from Russia and Armenia, Azerbeijan, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia are definitely released from their former sovereignty to Turkey. The way is thus cleared for their development as politically independent states. Are we to witness in this region a repetition of the process which in the Balkan Peninsula dragged along over a century, until the logical and natural issue in a complete political restoration of the suppressed Balkan nationalities was reached? When the special Con-

ference meets, it will find the path to a genuine solution rendered difficult, if not actually blocked, by the numerous secret treaties and more or less official agreements and declarations made by Great Britain, France, Greece and Italy during the war and affecting the region in question.

Fortunately, the unexpected turn of affairs in Russia has relieved the situation of one embarrassing element, namely, the agreement made by the Allies early in the war to give Constantinople to Russia, as her share of the spoils of the hoped-for victory, but enough, and more than enough, remains to show the hopelessness of a solution for the latest phase of the Eastern Question along the traditional lines of European diplomacy. The promise to give Constantinople to Russia is sufficient evidence that European diplomacy at the outbreak of the war had learnt nothing from the experiences of repeated failures in the Balkan muddle, and was proceeding along the old supposition that with

the disappearance of the Turkish Empire, the portions of it that could serve the interests of the European Powers were to be apportioned according to as reasonable a division as could be reached. In line with this, Italy upon entering the war was promised a large strip on the southern coast of Asia Minor, together with the Dodecanese Islands off this coast as her share—a section on which she had cast her longing eyes for some years before the war and in which she was developing a " zone " of influence, as the diplomatic phrase runs. Great Britain had evidently in mind for herself Palestine, as the natural bulwark to safeguard her control of Egypt, and also Mesopotamia, the outlet of which at the Persian Gulf she had practically controlled long before the war.[1] Her military campaigns in Mesopotamia and Palestine clearly pointed in that direction, and one must commend not only the skill of

[1] See the author's *The War and the Bagdad Railway*, p. 97, *seq.*

her military commanders, but also her foresight in organizing these campaigns which, following the strategy of Napoleon, were intended to strike a fatal blow at Turkey by securing control of one end of the historic highway stretching across Asia Minor. Even if Germany had won out on the Western front, Turkish sovereignty over the region beyond the Cilician gates would have been lost, unless—which was most unlikely—the English could have been dislodged from the strong position they had secured in Palestine and Mesopotamia. Syria, by a tacit understanding, was to go to France, by virtue of her strong interest in that region, over the Christian population of which she had exercised a wholesome and necessary protection for the past seventy years.

This policy of Great Britain and her associates was in consistent line with the traditional diplomacy of the European Powers towards the East; nor is it brought forward here for the purpose of criticism, but rather

to show that from the "traditional" point of view, Great Britain took precisely the steps needed to protect her interests in Egypt and India. Similarly, the agreement she made in 1916, as now transpires, with the Sherif of Mecca, Husain ibn Ali, in proclaiming him as King of Hedjaz, and in giving him not only substantial support to enforce his claims as the ruler of the strip of Arabia along the Red Sea, but dangling before him the possibility of the reorganization of a great Arabic State in return for his aid in uniting the Arabs against Turkey, was entirely proper as a further means of strengthening Great Britain's hold over that part of the Near East which she needed in order to protect her interests, but it is a further indictment of the traditional policy under which she acted, that as in every other instance in which the policy has been applied to the Eastern Question, it has always failed to bring about a solution of the problem involved; nay more, it has generally made

the problem more of a muddle than it had been. The Sherif (i.e., "Noble") of the holy city of Mecca, has always regarded himself as occupying a peculiar position as the custodian of the most sacred sanctuary of Islam, the Caaba in Mecca, the centre of the annual pilgrimage of Moslems from all parts of the world. He was never a caliph, though some of the occupants of the Sherifate had ambitions in that direction, but his authority, increased by the fact that the occupant was supposed to be a descendant of Ali, the son-in-law of the prophet, was always recognized as a matter of policy by the Sultan at Constantinople. To the Arabs, constituting the very core of orthodox Mohammedanism, the Turkish yoke had always been distasteful, and Great Britain, in picking out the Sherif of Mecca as the leader of a possible movement for the reconstitution of a great Arab State, foresaw that the sanctity attaching to his position would be an important factor; and so it proved to be. But Great

Britain once having aroused the dream of a new Arabia was obliged to go perhaps further than she intended in spreading the impression among the followers of the newly created king, that a renaissance period was about to be ushered in, which would lead to a greater Arabia to include, as in former days, the Arabs of Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia as well. There does not appear to have been any written agreement but an understanding, which apparently was not understood by the two parties in the same way. King Husain sent his son, Emir (*i.e.*, "prince") Faisal to represent the interests of the promised Arab State at Paris. Faisal is said to be a man of striking ability and of clearness of vision, bent upon the carrying out of the bargain.

His demand, however, for a greater Arabia has naturally encountered opposition both from the French, who laid claims to Syria, and from the Zionists who pointed to the declaration which Mr. Balfour, as Secretary

of Foreign Affairs, made in a letter to Lord Rothschild (November, 1917), from which they concluded that Palestine was to be transformed into a Jewish State. Mr. Balfour did not say this, but merely that His Majesty's government viewed "with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people," but the Zionists read into this declaration that Great Britain approved of the aims of political Zionism. The Zionists, accordingly, sent their representatives to Paris to press their claims, with the natural result of a clash between them and Prince Faisal, followed by attempts to come to some kind of an understanding to reconcile the promises given to each. By such promises and counter-promises, a situation has been created in Palestine and Syria that is probably one of the reasons why the whole question of the disposition of what remained of the Turkish Empire has been left to a special conference. The natives of Syria, particularly the Christians, do not

relish the idea of coming under Arab control now that they have been freed from Turkey. They are pleading for an independent state, and while sympathetic to France do not see why they should be under French domination.[2] The Mohammedan population of Palestine has been aroused by the plan of the Zionists eventually to obtain control of that land. It is of little use for the Zionists to change their attitude under pressure of the setback which their representatives received at the hands of the Supreme Council,[3] and place the hope of a Jewish State in the future, for as long as Zionism retains as part of its program the *plan* of supplanting the present majority population of Mohammedans, the movement will arouse suspicion and intensify the unfriendly feelings between Jews, Mohammedans and Christians in a land which is sacred to all and in the future control of

[2] See the statement issued as Bulletin Vol. I, No. 9, by the Syrian National Society, *Syria for the Syrians* (Boston, 1919).

[3] See Jastrow, *Zionism and the Future of Palestine*, p. xiv.

which all should share alike. Unfavorable as the situation was in Palestine and Syria before the war, it has been made worse by the prospect now facing the population after being freed from the Turkish yoke, of being asked to submit to a new one, or as an alternative to be eventually driven to the wall by a large immigration into a land not capable of holding more than double the present population.[4] The outlook for Palestine and Syria is not bright, if the traditional diplomatic policy of Europe is to be the guiding principle at the coming Conference. Just because of the sacred historic associations of this portion of the Near East, it will be a menace to peace, as serious as the perpetual turmoil in the Balkan Peninsula was such a menace for more than a century.

There is still another troublesome factor that has arisen in this third region, because of the continued sway of the traditional

[4] Palestine has at present some 700,000, of which 60 per cent. are natives professing Mohammedanism.

diplomacy during the war—the presence of a large Greek population along the western coast of Asia Minor, which does not relish either the continuance under Turkish control, or the introduction of Italy as a newcomer into this region who may, by further extension, become an uncomfortably close neighbor. The Greeks of Asia Minor are asking the embarrassing question, why if Italy, whose interest in the region is recent, is to receive a slice of Asia Minor they should not be recognized as an integral part of the Hellenic Kingdom? The Greek Prime Minister Venizelos, one of the ablest and most sympathetic figures in modern diplomacy, has as a counter-irritant to Italy's ambitions put in a claim for Greek control of a part of the coastline of Asia with some *Hinterland.* Asia Minor was at one time predominatingly Greek. Greeks in large numbers have been settled there since the days of antiquity, just as they have always enjoyed commercial supremacy in Constantinople, for which like-

wise they have appeared as claimants now that Russia is out of the race. According to the traditional diplomatic policy of bandying countries about from one control to the other, it must be admitted, Greece has a very strong case in her favor. The question of how to dispose of Constantinople is perhaps the hardest nut for the statesmen to crack at the coming Conference. The mere suggestion of handing it over to Greece would arouse the other Balkan States to a violent outbreak. It would cause the ghost of the Balkan Question to rise in full armor, while to force the Turk to give up its possession after these many centuries might stir up the Mohammedans of India who, curiously enough, have a strong sentiment for the Sultan as symbolizing the headship of Islam. Already we have heard of demonstrations among the Turks in Constantinople and elsewhere at the rumor that the control of the metropolis was to be wrested out of their hands. Wise heads in France and Great

Britain, free from any suspicion of being Turkophiles, have raised warnings against reconverting the mosque of St. Sophia into a Christian Church. Though the Turkish Empire has come to an end as a result of the war, the Turks are still there, some seven millions of them in Asia Minor. To establish an Asiatic Turkey with its capital at Konia at once raises the question as to the inclusion of the sea-coast. If that is to be given to Greece, where is the boundary line to be drawn, since Greeks are to be found inland and Turks on the coast? Would not such division create a new complication of the ever-troublesome Eastern Question—a new head to the monstrous Hydra? And so we swing around the circle to the point whence we started out.

Certainly the thought of entirely dissolving Turkey by handing over Asia Minor to some Power would be sheer madness. The demonstrations of the Turks above referred to have not been limited to a protest against

taking Constantinople away from them, but against the dissolution of the Empire. Having imposed their yoke for five weary centuries on peoples foreign to them, the Turks know from experiences which they forced upon others, how distasteful it is to a people to be regarded as a political dependency. It is hardly to be expected that any people will submit to be wiped out as a political factor without some struggle, and the Turk is a fighter as well as a hater. The reports that reach us from time to time of renewed hostilities of the Turks against the unhappy Armenians reflect the kind of activity going on in territory still under Turkish control. When your fighting blood is up you strike the first fellow that you meet, and Armenia is the Turk's nearest neighbor.

In the meanwhile there are some definite results brought about by the war in this third region of the Near East which need to be recognized in order to complete our view of the situation. Armenia and Georgia have

taken the bull by the horns and declared their independence, as in Eastern Europe, upon the collapse of Russia and the inability of Austria-Hungary to maintain her empire, even before an armistice was asked for, Ukraine, Poland and Bohemia [5] took matters into their own hands and established themselves into separate Republics, while Hungary dissolved her union with Austria, and Servia combined with Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina to organize the Jugo-Slav Kingdom.[6] That is one way of settling problems by anticipating the wranglings of the diplomats. The Paris Conference faced with a *fait accompli* has officially recognized these states, with the exception of Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia which did not come within the sphere of the four treaties with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary, up to the present drawn up by the

[5] Officially known in the treaty with Austria as the Czecho-Slovak State.

[6] Officially designated in the Treaty with Austria as the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

Conference. For all that, Armenia is on the map as an independent republic and there to stay, though she needs outside support to protect her from the Georgians to the north, from the Turks to the West and from Kurds who are all about her. The situation is precarious for a people that has been so terribly weakened by frightful massacres and by hardships almost beyond human endurance so that one is amazed to find any vitality left among that remarkable people. The spirit shown by Armenia may be regarded as the one bright spot in a political situation that is otherwise sombre. Her independence was secured by her own initiative, not brought to her through outside support as a political move, as was the case with the newly formed Arab state. The Georgians, too, have established a republic of their own, though how stable it is remains to be seen. Had the Arabs, Palestinians, Syrians and Mesopotamians similarly taken matters into their own hands, the task before the special

conference would have been simplified. Here, however, the successful campaigns of the English in Mesopotamia and Palestine have made Great Britain the virtual governor of these regions pending the settlement of the Turkish question. The Arab State exists for the present by her suffrage, while France has anticipated what she expects to be the decision of the conference in regard to Syria by sending General Gouraud to take command of the two important ports of Alexandretta and Beirut and the intervening coast territory, in the hope that the *Hinterland* up to Damascus will be brought under French control. Greece's occupation of Smyrna and adjacent coastland has likewise been sanctioned by the Allies, as a provisional measure.

Such, in brief, is the situation largely brought about by the continuation during the war of the old-time spirit that attempted to settle the Near-Eastern Question in 1856 and 1878. The only difference between then

and now is a balance in favor of a greater muddle at the present time. Unless an entirely different principle is set up at the coming Conference, nothing is to be expected except further outbursts of fanaticism of the Turks against Greeks and Armenians, the outbreak of hostilities between Greeks and Italians, the rising up of Palestinian Mohammedans against the Jews, and of Syrian natives against the ambitions of the Arabs. A gloomy outlook, indeed, almost justifying the cynical prophecy that another war will have to be fought to end the war resulting from the attempt to end all wars.

The sick man of Europe, artificially kept alive by the doctor diplomats of Europe, has at last passed away, but the corpse seems to be as troublesome as the moribund patient.

CHAPTER III

Mandates Not a Solution

The Paris Conference has brought into the foreground what appears to be a really new principle—mandates, instead of an actual division of the spoils. A mandate may be defined as a trusteeship committed to a Power with the proviso that the Power so entrusted is responsible to the League of Nations, which forms an inherent part of the four treaties so far negotiated by the Conference. All four treaties—with Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria—open with the 28 articles of the League of Nations, and throughout the text of the treaties the formation of the League as the ultimate central body and supreme court of the nations is not only assumed, but explicitly referred to. A Power, therefore, acting as a mandate is theoretically merely the agent of the League,

and by its regular reports to the League is under the control of the latter. So far so good.

The mandate principle first came to the fore during the Peace Conference in connection with the question how to dispose of the German possessions in East Africa and in the Pacific islands. The interesting little volume of Ray Stannard Baker on "What Wilson did at Paris" (1919)[1] is most illuminative on this point; and since Mr. Baker was the medium of communication through whom Mr. Wilson gave to the press the daily summary of what was done by the Conference, his statements may be regarded as authoritative. It is, therefore, no longer a secret that Lloyd George and Clemenceau stood out for a division of the colonies between Great Britain and France, with Belgium also claiming a slice of the spoils of victory. In other words, at the opening of the Conference the European Powers still

[1] Pp. 29–35.

stood on the time-honored platform of remaking the map of the world by an agreement among the victors of what would seem to them to be an equitable division. The Conference was to be a bargaining contest, following along the lines of its predecessors in 1815, 1856, 1878 and 1906. Italy and Japan stood on the same platform when questions arose that affected their interests—Fiume and the Dalmatian Coast in the case of the former, Shantung in the case of the latter. Against this coalition to maintain the traditional diplomatic methods of Europe President Wilson stood out for the acceptance of the fifth of his fourteen points, according to which nations were no longer to be handed from one control to another without their express desire. The Conference seemed deadlocked. It was the first clash between the old and the new diplomacy. From Mr. Baker's narrative, it is clear that both sides realized the irreconcilability of two ideals, as decidedly opposed to another

as were the two theories of government—democracy *versus* military autocracy—that were involved in the war. The war issued in a distinct triumph for the democratic principle, as is evidenced by the overthrow of autocracy in Germany, Austria and Russia. The issue involved in the peace resulted in a compromise, for we must frankly recognize the principle of mandates as such. When the suggestion was first brought forward by President Wilson as a way out of the *impasse,* it was strenuously opposed by Lloyd George and Clemenceau, but the President declined to be dislodged from his position and finally, as Mr. Baker tells us, Lloyd George after a conference with his British associates agreed to accept the mandatory principle, and Clemenceau's consent was obtained.

Was it a victory for Mr. Wilson? The impartial verdict of the historian of the future will, I think, recognize it as such, for the compromise did not involve a

sacrifice of the principle for which the President stood. In the case of peoples unable because of their backward condition to establish a form of government in accord with modern ideas, a tutelage is desirable. A mandatory power answers to this need, and since the League has it in its power to prevent the government entrusted with the mandate of stepping beyond the proper bounds and of frustrating any designs for transforming the mandate into an occupation of the country in question, the necessary safeguards for the preservation of the principle would appear to be provided. In international relations as in all other fields we can only expect progress step by step. The substitution of mandatory trusteeship for exploitation of victory in war represents such a forward step of enormous proportions—so large as almost to justify the designation of being a radical departure from the old diplomatic methods. But while recognizing this, we must not be blinded to the limitations in

the application of the mandate principle. These limitations, as well as certain difficulties and dangers, become apparent when the attempt is made to extend mandates to the present phase of the Eastern Question, as is now proposed. According to this plan, the lands once under Turkish control are to be divided up into natural divisions, and each division entrusted to some power that shall be responsible to the League of Nations. Now it may be admitted that with the third region of the Near East placed in the hands of mandatory powers, much may be accomplished in enabling the Near East to recover from the neglect and misrule from which it has suffered for centuries. Properly carried out, mandates would lead to the protection of the inhabitants, to introducing modern sanitation in Eastern towns and villages, encouraging commerce and industry, promoting education and in general bringing the East into better accord with Western standards of life and of its varied activities. But would

mandates furnish a solution of the Eastern Question? Mandates might be a complete success when applied to colonial tracts in Africa, and yet be a failure when applied to regions which were once centres of culture and may again become such under favorable conditions.

When we come to the distribution of the mandates for the Near East, the inherent weakness of the panacea shows itself in the difficulties to be encountered—difficulties that are almost, if not entirely, insurmountable if we assume that the mandate must in each case be assigned to *one* Power. There are only three possible candidates for mandates in the Near East in this sense—Great Britain, France and the United States. Neither Greece nor Italy can be regarded at present as being in a position to compete for the distinction. By an obvious division Great Britain would assume the mandate for Mesopotamia and Palestine, and France for Syria, which leaves the newly organized

states of Arabia, Armenia, Azerbeijan and Georgia and the rest of Asia Minor to be disposed of. If Arabia is to be entrusted to a mandatory Power, the logical candidate would again be Great Britain, which has already assumed a certain tutelage of the new state by the agreement with the king of Hedjaz. The United States meets with general favor as the mandatory Power for Armenia, but in the opinion of many competent students it would be unwise, as well as in many respects impracticable, to apportion Armenia and what we may conveniently call Turkish Asia Minor to two Powers. If this were done, however, one does not see how any other decision can be reached except again to assign to Great Britain the mandatory Power over Turkish Asia Minor. This would necessarily carry with it Constantinople, unless indeed Constantinople were to be recognized as a free city under international control. With the European Powers still wedded to the traditional methods as

evidenced by the treaties, agreements and declarations made by the Allies during the war, neither France nor Italy nor Greece can be expected to grow enthusiastic at the prospect of seeing Great Britain thus in practical control of the entire stretch of the historic highway across Asia Minor.

Bearing in mind the rôle which this highway has always played in history,[2] we would then have a close approach to the very situation the prospect of which brought on the war, to wit, a single power dominating the Near East to so large an extent as to overshadow the others, with this difference, to be sure, that Great Britain would exercise this control with far greater consideration for others and with far greater benefits to the rest of the world, than would have been the case if the pan-Germanic scheme had succeeded.

For all that, the danger would be there

[2] See for this rôle, the author's *The War and the Bagdad Railway*, Chapter II.

that even under the most liberal policy, the influence of Great Britain over the Near and the Far East would be predominating, if in addition to her possessions in India, she should also have the practical control of the stretch from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf on the one side, and to Egypt and Arabia on the other, for the intervening small region of Syria in the hands of France would be a negligible factor. The condition thus created would not be a healthy one and might easily, or at least conceivably, prove a source of danger to the world, and perhaps also to Great Britain herself. The possession of extraordinary power, even though the power would be answerable to a League of Nations, involves temptations that might reach a point which it would require superhuman strength to resist. Nor could Great Britain be blamed, if she should yield to the temptation to use her control of the historic highway of Asia Minor for the benefit of her Eastern possessions.

But Great Britain—so it is stated, and apparently on good authority—does not desire any mandates in the Near East outside of those for Palestine and Mesopotamia which would, in case of a division, fall to her naturally. The United States delegation at Paris is said to have favored the acceptance on the part of this country of a mandate for Armenia. The suggestion has met with strong support in influential quarters, and recently men prominent in public life and acquainted with conditions in the Near East, like the ex-Ambassador to Turkey, the Hon. Henry Morgenthau,[3] have urged that we should also accept the mandate for Constantinople and Turkish Asia Minor. There seems every reason to believe that such a plan would meet with the favor of the European Powers, and it may also be admitted that, if we agree, it would relieve the situation of the embarrassing promise given to Italy by the Allies upon

[3] See the article by Mr. Morgenthau in the *New York Times* for November 9, 1919.

her entering the war, to hand over to her a part of the southern coast of Asia Minor and the Dodecanese Islands, as it would also dispose of Greece's demand for a portion of the western coast with some *Hinterland.* But strong opposition has also been expressed by Americans as well as by Armenians against thus combining a mandate for Armenia with one for Turkish Asia Minor and which would logically include Georgia and Azerbeijan, for fear that it would result in strengthening the Turks and in weakening the Armenians.[4] Those interested in Armenia from the point of view of Christianity want a strong Armenia to act as a barrier in the way of Pan-Turanianism, which looms up in the minds of these observers as a complement to the menace of Pan-Islamism.

[4] See the pamphlet under the title *The Joint Mandate Scheme,* issued by the "American Committee for the Independence of Armenia," with articles by the Hon. James W. Gerard, Rev. L. P. Chambers (for many years resident in Armenia), Gen. Bagratuni, the Armenian military leader, and others.

American sympathy with the unfortunate Armenians manifested in so striking a manner during the past years is a strong factor in favor of accepting the mandate at least for this large stretch of territory. We are in an exceptionally favorable position to be of the greatest possible service to the region in question, both because of our country's wealth and strength, and because we are free from any ambition for territorial control or political exploitation. But, on the other hand, the objections that have been urged against the proposal are too serious to be lightly brushed aside. Under present conditions, a mandate for Armenia, or for Armenia and Turkish Asia Minor, would involve sending across the water and maintaining on the spot a considerable army to maintain order and to help in building up the region. The size of such an army is estimated by an American commission recently returned from a tour of inspection at 50,000. Others place the figure even higher. There

is no mistaking the strong feeling existing in this country against entering into any further military activities on the other side of the ocean, now that with our help the menace to the civilized world for which we entered the war has been removed. It is well that this feeling does exist, for it contributes to the conviction, growing deeper among the great masses in all countries, that the burdens of great armies and navies must be removed from the shoulders of the people, and that the further peaceable progress of the world is conditional upon some plan for the gradual reduction of armaments everywhere. The constitution of the League of Nations emphasizes this in Article VIII. If the United States, as a nation free from any militaristic ambitions, were to furnish the example of a standing army of large proportions, it is felt that there would be little hope of ever carrying out a policy of gradual disarmament throughout the world. Besides, even those who decidedly favor our accept-

ance of the mandate must confess that such an undertaking is an entirely new departure for this country, contrary to our traditions and to our feelings. The pertinent question is asked, why should we assume a guardianship for a part of the world with which, outside of promoting commercial and friendly relations, we have nothing to do, and with which we have nothing in common?

One may not fully share this point of view, but one must recognize its existence, as well as its force. No nation, not even one as young as ours, can throw aside its traditions without a struggle in order to assume a new rôle. One need not urge the somewhat irrelevant argument that because Washington or Jefferson or both warned against entangling alliances, therefore we must avoid participation in political affairs outside of this continent, no matter how changed the circumstances since the days of the founding of the Republic. A far more potent argument may be found in the consideration that a nation,

having followed a policy of political isolation for one hundred and forty years to be finally drawn into an international conflict, not of her making, is fearful of the consequences, if she allows herself to be further led away from what would seem to have been her natural destiny, to wit, the confinement of her activities to this continent. To accept a mandate for Armenia or for Armenia and Turkish Asia Minor would be an experiment that might turn out well or badly, and a people naturally pauses and should pause before entering upon a doubtful experiment. This hesitation must not, however, go to the extreme of refusing to be led, if circumstances point the way to a road which, though new, may for all that represent the *natural* direction. All that can reasonably be demanded is to furnish the proof that the new way does represent a logical and natural step, and is not being forced upon us by those who either have solely their own interests in view, or are actuated by some other motive than the one that appears on the surface.

It is manifestly impossible for the world to pass through a tremendous upheaval without bringing in its wake changed relations of nations and lands to one another. You cannot, after being subjected to an experience that affects your whole being, settle down to the same kind of existence that you led before. The creation of a League of Nations as one of the most significant outcomes of the war would be merely a paper document if it did not carry with it some additional obligations. Our participation in it would be purely nominal, if we were not willing to do our share in the reconstruction of the new world that is to replace the one that has passed away. The League is the symbol of the new spirit of international coöperation, by means of which it is hoped to avert the repetition of the disastrous catastrophe brought on by the overreaching ambitions of a nation that was led astray by false ideals. But just as we were a factor in bringing about the triumph of the democratic

principle, so the firm establishment of this principle throughout the world requires our aid. We stand emphatically for the policy of the self-government of peoples, which means that those peoples who are not yet able to govern themselves should realize that they are placed under the tutelage of more advanced nations *solely* with this end in view and no other. We are free from the suspicion of ulterior motives. We need no territory as a bulwark to our possessions, and we are not menaced by any encroachment on our domain. But on the other hand, it should be recognized that in the fulfillment of obligations that would rest upon us as a member of the League of Nations, we ought not to be asked to take a step which should involve the further sacrifice of young American lives.

The crucial objection to our taking a mandate over Eastern lands is clearly the necessity under the present plan of mandates of maintaining a large American army on the spot. It is true that those who are advocating

the acceptance also give the assurance that the army will only be required for a few years, and that during the interval a native militia will be organized to undertake the protection of the region involved, but what guarantee can be given that events will move in that direction? With the Near East divided into mandates assigned to three powers, each maintaining a considerable army and Great Britain, in fact, a very large one, because of the large part of the Near East for which she will have the responsibility, is it not conceivable that in the case of some disagreement among the mandatory powers, these armies may turn against one another? Moreover, the presence of several large armies in the Near East will not be conducive towards inspiring the nations with confidence in the ultimate aim to fit them for self-government. The situation would be different if there were a small force in each subdivision of the region or—better still—one army under unit control, scattered throughout the region. Under

such conditions the aim of merely policing the territory would be more self-evident.

This brings us directly to the question whether mandates, as at present contemplated, offer a satisfactory solution for the Eastern Question that may be expected finally to quiet the ghost that has stalked through the chancelleries of Europe for more than a century? Will the Eastern Question not come back again to disturb the peace of the world? I venture to set up the thesis that the division of the Near East into mandates, distributed among several powers, may at best offer temporary relief, and if not at its best may lead to further complications. Unless the nations accepting mandates have purged their souls of *all* imperialistic ambitions, of all desire for territorial expansion, a mandate is merely a thin diplomatic disguise for occupation of a country. Occupation shades by fine degrees into a protectorate, and the protectorate yields, when a crisis ensues, to permanent proprie-

torship. Such is the experience of the past, and we are still too near the era when ambitions for extending territorial control were the rule among European Powers to leave the possibility of a repetition of past experience out of account. Italy's attitude towards Fiume and the Dalmatian Coast, whatever the rights and wrongs in the case, may be regarded as a warning that the era of a desire for conquest is not yet past; nor is the recent intervention of Great Britain in the affairs of Persia, against which our government has entered a protest, particularly reassuring. It is not necessary to assume a sinister motive or a deliberate intent, if we find a mandatory power led from one step to the other, running the gamut from trusteeship to proprietorship. Circumstances are often more potent than deliberate intent. " Man glaubt zu schieben und man wird geschoben," says Goethe.

It has already been suggested that a policy that would work well in East Africa might not produce the same satisfactory results in

the Near East, where we are dealing with an old cultural region in which great civilizations arose and flourished, and which are occupied by peoples that are to a large extent the direct descendants of those who once occupied the position of leaders. The Near East has through misrule and neglect fallen into decay from which there is now an opportunity offered, with the aid of Western Powers, of rescuing it. East Africa has a future, but the Near East has also a past. Such a region, if it is to be placed under tutelage, must be approached in a different spirit from the one that would be proper in dealing with the former German possessions in East Africa and in the islands of the Pacific. East Africa is a region which needs large immigation from cultural lands in order to be developed. The Near East is pretty thickly populated in the most desirable sections. It is the native population that needs to be developed and indeed protected against uncontrolled immigration that may—particularly in Palestine

—drive that population to the wall. What will have been gained, if the Near East rescued from Turkish misrule should thus be subjected to a further process of exploitation, that would appear to be inevitable unless, to repeat the refrain, a guiding principle be set up that will effectually exclude the methods hitherto pursued by European diplomacy in dealing with the problem?

Trusteeship in the form of mandates entrusted to various powers, each for the time being in control of some section of the Near East assuredly represents a decided advance over the old methods, but furnishes no guarantee, or at all events, not a sufficient guarantee that these methods may not enjoy a renaissance under a disguised form. For, let us also remember that nations like individuals are human, and that in the proposition to give the mandate over Palestine and Mesopotamia to Great Britain and that over Syria to France, the interests of these Powers in the lands in question is the controlling

motive. This involves no indictment against Great Britain and France for having such interests, for, as some one has remarked, it requires a certain amount of selfishness to be altruistic. Unless a country has some specific interest in assuming the tutelage of another, she can hardly develop sufficient enthusiasm to continue the obligations involved, if they should become irksome. Just because Great Britain *has* such an interest in assuming the mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia, we may expect her to put forth her strongest effort in developing the resources of those lands. Already the excellent results of Great Britain's provisional occupation of Palestine and Mesopotamia are to be seen. Official corruption has ceased and given way to orderly government. Jerusalem and Bagdad have been made safe and healthy. Roads are being improved and railroads are being built. One may travel now by rail from Port Said to Jerusalem and thence to Damascus. The Bagdad Railway has been

completed from Bagdad to Basra, and northwards to Mosul; and in a short time, the entire stretch from Constantinople to Basra will be in operation. Plans for the education of the people are being thought out, and scientific exploration is planned. By the introduction of scientific irrigation, towards which a splendid beginning was made under Great Britain's direction even before the war,[5] we may expect in a few years to find Mesopotamia recovering the position she held in the ancient world as a great granary. In Palestine we may expect to see desert lands turned into fertile districts. The impetus towards achieving such results would be all the greater because of the interest that England has at stake in the position of Palestine as an outpost to Egypt, and the importance to England of the control of the Persian Gulf. Because France, too, has a decided

[5] See the plans for the construction of the Hindia and other Barrages in Sir William Willcock's *Irrigation in Mesopotamia* (London, 1911). The Hindia Barrage was completed at the end of 1913.

interest in accepting a mandate over Syria, that land may be expected to prosper as it never did under Turkish misrule. Both England and France have given ample proof in Egypt and Algiers that they know how to administer the affairs of foreign lands with due regard to the interests of the natives as well as their own. But when the time comes to hand over these states to the native population, will these powers be ready to do so? Would it not be human if a sentiment should be developed in Great Britain and France against abandoning control after large sums had been expended on building roads, on improving port facilities, on introducing irrigation schemes, building schools and more of the like, all involving enormous outlays which can only be partially recovered by commercial advantages of which other nations than those paying for the improvements will be able to avail themselves. One cannot beg the question, whether the same situation would not some day arise in

Palestine and Mesopotamia, that now confronts Great Britain in Egypt and India. Will gratitude for benefits received prevent a people, becoming conscious of its strength, from giving expression to the instinct of self-government? Or, have we the right to expect idealism in a people to go so far as to injure their own interests, or what they regard as such, by an altruistic abandonment of a control to the results of which they can point with pride and satisfaction?

Ah, but the League of Nations can force a decision! Even the League of Nations will be powerless, if those whose influence will be strongest in the Supreme Council will feel it incumbent to support one another, because actuated by the same spirit. If France, England, Italy and, let us say, Japan, are in the same boat, it is not likely that anyone of these nations will attempt to rock it for fear of a general spill. It is too much under these circumstances to expect a complete abandonment of the traditional European

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diplomacy *even* under the political and moral pressure of a League of Nations aiming to set up a new guiding principle. There will be temptations to lapse back into the old methods, and mandates as at present contemplated will, precisely in the measure that they are successfully and efficiently carried out, be apt to furnish the temptation rather than to suppress it.

And this brings me back to the question, how a mandate assumed by the United States can be expected to retain the backing of public opinion, which is essential, in the face of the inequality in results, due to our *not* having any particular interests in Armenia or in Turkish Asia Minor, as against the advantages that will accrue to such Powers as Great Britain and France from their mandates, because of their special interests in the lands placed under their control? Assuming that we take the mandate for Armenia and Turkish Asia Minor, without the slightest desire for territorial control, how long will

we, with our strong commercial instincts, be likely to continue advancing loans of doubtful return to undertake necessary improvements, costing many millions to put large districts in proper condition? The absence of any selfish motive will deprive us of the humanly necessary stimulus patiently to continue efforts that are of no special advantage to us. With the example of other nations deriving profit from their non-altruistic endeavors, will we have the necessary strength of mind to continue a policy which involves a perpetual liability, and that furnishes no prospect of ever being turned into an asset? While, therefore, we should recognize, and recognize joyfully, the signal advance marked over former methods of disposing of lands that had been freed from Turkish sovereignty, by the explicit recognition of the principle of trusteeship, supported and guaranteed by a League of the larger and smaller powers of the civilized world, yet it is idle to close our eyes to the

practical difficulties involved in the present proposal for the distribution of mandates in the Near East.

To sum up, we are thus brought face to face upon the termination of the war with a new aspect of the Eastern Question, but the underlying problem is the same which loomed up when towards the close of the eighteenth century the process of dissolution of the once mighty Turkish Empire had set in. That process, we have seen, creates the Eastern Question and dominates its various and changing aspects as the dissolution proceeds. In the one region of the Near East—the North African coast—forcible seizure on the part of the European Powers, alternating with more peaceful occupation, though backed by military and naval force, has been the method adopted. The result on the one hand has been to lead, under the wise and efficient policy pursued by Great Britain and France, to greatly improving the economic, educational and hygienic conditions and in

advancing the status of the population, but on the other hand to bring about with that advance the creation of a new aspect of the problem, with which Great Britain is now faced in Egypt, and which France may have to face in Algiers and Tunis. In the second region—the Balkan Peninsula—the natural solution of the problem through the rise of the forcibly suppressed nationalities was retarded through the constant attempts of the traditional European diplomacy to interfere with the natural process, until finally through the recent war the process has reached its logical conclusion. For the third region—Asia Minor and its outposts—the question now confronts the world whether the process of the gradual revival of the populations, languishing as a result of centuries of suppression and of misrule, is to be accelerated or likewise to be retarded. It is a question of vital interest to all the Western nations, including our own, for the Eastern Question in this latest phase is still fraught with that

fatal and inherent power of creating international conflicts into which we will again be drawn, as we were in the recent one. We have seen that the principle underlying mandates *does* represent a decided advance over the methods that were adopted in the case of the two other regions, but it has also been pointed out that the distribution of mandates involves difficulties that are almost if not entirely insuperable, that the carrying out of the trusteeship under the plan proposed does not remove the danger of an evolution of trusteeship in the direction of proprietorship with all the new problems that would arise from such a contingency. In addition to this, the disinclination of popular opinion in this country against the acceptance of a mandate over a portion of the third region, and the uncertainty of our being willing to continue indefinitely the obligations involved, even if we did assume such a mandate, creates a situation that may frustrate the entire plan, because without our participation, practi-

cally the entire control of the Near East would pass to a single Power. This would produce precisely the contingency that brought on the war, with the difference merely of a change in the dominating Power from Germany to Great Britain. Have we then actually reached an *impasse* in our discussion of the Eastern Question, or is there a way out of the political maze?

CHAPTER IV

Internationalism as a Solution of the Eastern Question

"The greatest triumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics." This sentiment, expressed by Gladstone as far back as 1870, voices in succinct form the antithesis to the traditional method of European diplomacy which continued to be applied to the Eastern Question till the outbreak of the war of 1914. Our participation in the Paris Conference has materially helped to bring into the foreground the "idea of public right," as the basis for settling the problems pressing for a solution in various parts of Europe upon the termination of the war. Despite their human imperfections, the treaties drawn up in Paris represent a great advance in the

direction of giving the first consideration to freeing peoples from a yoke forced upon them by seizure or conquest. It is the "idea of public right" that must be applied to the Eastern Question, if we are to look forward to a definite solution at some time in the future. We must head in the right direction; and that involves, as the first prerequisite, the full and frank abandonment of the traditional diplomatic policy still represented by at least some of the European Powers towards the East. Is it not possible to hold on to the correct principle underlying the mandatory idea, and yet advance to a form in its application which will obviate the dangers, difficulties and objections inherent in assigning the trusteeship of each of the subdivisions of the third region to *one* power? I believe yes, if we will interpret the trusteeship *in terms of international coöperation;* and I venture to think that in support of this thesis, one may urge that the logic of the situation points unmistakably towards as-

signing to international commissions the tutelage of the nine subdivisions into which the third region naturally falls, (1) Constantinople, (2) Turkish Asia Minor, (3) Armenia, (4) Georgia, (5) Azerbeijan, (6) Syria, (7) Palestine, (8) Mesopotamia, and (9) Arabia.

It was the international *motif* that brought the nations together during the war to overcome a menace that threatened the liberties of the entire world. Making due allowance for the instinct of self-preservation which was assuredly a factor in uniting all of the great and many of the smaller Powers against Germany, it was in the final analysis the menace to the pivotal idea of international obligations involved in Germany's violation of Belgium's neutrality that changed the issue of the war from what it first appeared to be, the pan-Germanic scheme for the control of the East into a moral one, which far transcended the purely selfish in-

terests of any of the nations involved.[1] Our entrance into the war further accentuated the international spirit in which the war was waged by those united against Germany. A war fought for the purpose of " making the world safe for democracy "—whether it has entirely accomplished this or not—is in itself an expression of the international spirit. Does not the logic of circumstances, therefore, point to making the attempt to solve the problems arising out of the war by the application of this same spirit? That spirit lies at the basis of the League of Nations which, as the most significant outcome of the war, has been entwined with the four treaties in such a way that the League furnishes the guarantee for the execution of the provisions of the treaties. All questions such as the physical fixing of boundaries, the determination of indemnities and reparations,

[1] I have endeavored to set this forth in detail in *The War and the Coming Peace,* which deals largely with the "Moral Issue."

the government of territories temporarily ceded from the Central Powers, such as the Saar Basin and Upper Silesia, the supervision of plebiscites, the execution of the military, naval and air clauses in the treaties, the settlement of pre-war debts and of all property involved in the war, the regulation of water-ways are by the treaties placed in the hands of international commissions, composed of representatives of the nations directly interested and concerned. Some forty such international commissions are already provided for, and the number may be still further increased as new questions are brought before the League of Nations. Internationalism may, therefore, be designated as the very keystone of the work done by the Peace Conference.

It is not difficult to detect the guiding thought of the Conference which has thus inaugurated, on a far larger scale than could have been dreamt of a few years ago, the policy of international coöperation. The com-

bination of nations, united in carrying on the war, was in itself a League of Nations. They had a common aim, and the result having been achieved by united efforts, the settlement of problems arising out of the war, it was felt, should likewise be faced in common. It is this continuation of international coöperation *after* the armistice that stamps the war through which we have passed as of an entirely different character from previous international conflicts. The war marked a crisis, because it formed the climax to a movement that had been silently going on for a long time, a movement accelerated by the great discoveries and inventions that brought the various parts of the world closer together, and that found its natural expression in the many international unions established during the past decades, international postal unions, international exhibitions, international congresses of scientific bodies, international commercial and political gatherings, international exchange of professorships among

institutions of learning; and the like. The war which at its outbreak might have seemed to be a factor making for the breaking up of this international spirit of coöperation, turns out to have been in reality the culminating act in bringing about an international union among civilized nations organized on the basis of democracy. The League of Nations was established *by* the war and *during* the war. What the Peace Conference did was to change the unwritten constitution into a written one, the articles of which merely gave voice to the principles that bound the Allies together during the hostilities. Those who look for a millenium or even for the total cessation of wars, now that the League has been constituted and is beginning to function, will, of course, be doomed to disappointment. The League must be viewed solely as an index of the *direction* in which from now on the great and small nations of the world may be expected to move; it marks the perfectly logical climax of

a long antecedent process that would have been reached eventually without the war, but which the war greatly accelerated.

Now, then, if we apply this spirit of international coöperation for which the League primarily stands to the Eastern Question, we will be instinctively led, in the endeavor to guide and educate the peoples of the East to the point where they may take the direction of their affairs into their own hands, not to a distribution of what remains of the Turkish Empire to a group of Powers, each entrusted with a mandate over some subdivision, but to a *sharing* of the responsibilities and obligations, precisely as in the case of the international commissions constituted by the treaties, drawn up by the Peace Conference. In other words, the tutelage over the peoples of the East should, in consistent accord with the spirit of international coöperation, be confided to international commissions, on each of which Great Britain, France and the United States should be represented,

together with representatives of two or three other Powers especially interested, and—an important point—there should also be representation on each commission of the *native* population. A consideration of the present situation in the Near East after the war confirms me in the position which I took in my book on "The War and the Bagdad Railway," [2] published a little over two years ago, in which the proposition was made for the appointment of international commissions after the war, under the control of a League of Nations, to act according to the various conditions existing in the lands in question, as directing and controlling agencies, in regulating the finances of the countries involved, in encouraging and promoting commerce and industry, and in performing all the other functions needed gradually to bring the populations to a position where they will be able to exercise self-government.

The failure of the traditional diplomatic

[2] Pp. 148–149.

European diplomacy in dealing with the various aspects of the Eastern Question as they arose one after the other, and the hopeless muddle created by the attempt to continue that policy during the war, leading to the necessity of proposing a special conference to take up the present aspect of the Question, are counterbalanced by the success of the method adopted in the conduct of the war and by the success of the guiding principle of the Paris Conference in leading to the establishment of a large number of international commissions, as the means of settling the problems for the European countries arising directly out of the provisions of the treaties. Through such commissions the opportunity is afforded of testing the practicability as well as the justice of these provisions. Some, possibly many, will need to be modified. Just because the commissions represent not one Power but a group, they will be actuated, by the very psychology of the situation, to reach conclusions fair to all

the parties directly interested; and the commissions will have the confidence of the League in any modifications that may be proposed. If the international spirit of cooperation prevails among the commissions and in the League—and both will break up unless this is the case—the errors in the treaties will be corrected and the wrongs—and in the opinion of many, the treaties contain such wrongs—will be rectified.

Many of the difficulties, confronting the European commissions, will not be encountered in the case of the international commissions appointed as joint trustees for the subdivisions of the Near East. With the exception of the Turks, we would be dealing with peoples who have already been gained for the cause represented by the Allies; and with the elimination of the administrative Turk, who is the *real* source of trouble in the Near East, it would not be a difficult task to gain the confidence and good will of the Anatolian Turk, who, in the opinion of

those who know him best, is quiet and harmless when not stirred up by a sinister administration.

The International Commissions would have a freer hand and a far clearer field in the Near East than in the case of the commissions appointed for European countries for certain specific purposes, for their chief function would be the reorganization of the region entrusted to them. Theirs would be primarily a work of *reconstruction,* of regulating the finances of the countries, of superintending the building of roads and of improving methods of transportation, of establishing a modern system of education, and in various other ways steadily raising the status of the population These are all matters in which the political factor need not enter, unless we *deliberately* introduce it. The character of the work suggests that the Commissioners be chosen because of their expert qualifications, and not from political motives. In each case there should obviously be a

financial expert, a transportation expert and an educational expert, while every commission would naturally be required to have also a military expert with the necessary number of aides to raise and to command native militia for the protection of the country. It is needless here, where we are concerned with setting forth merely the general plan as affording a genuine solution of the Eastern Question, to enter into details. Nor do I feel competent to do so, for the plan can only be worked out in detail after a careful study of the conditions prevailing in each of the nine subdivisions of the region in question. It will be more useful to point out the many advantages of this proposal over the present disposition to entrust each one of the subdivisions to a single mandatory power.

As the first advantage, I would register that under this plan the financial obligations incurred in providing loans for building and improving roads, in promoting irrigation projects—in Mesopotamia, Central Asia

Minor,[3] and parts of Palestine—and in securing better housing facilities as well as in introducing an adequate school system, so essential to all the subdivisions, would be *shared* by the Western nations, instead of falling in each case as a burden on the one entrusted with a mandate, while the benefits to be derived would accrue to all. It is obvious that the peoples of the Near East cannot be placed on the road to recovery from their present languishing and devitalized condition without large loans. While the conditions vary considerably, yet financial aid will be required for all sections; and the determination of the amount and the character of the loans can best be arrived at by a joint study of the entire situation. The lines of demarcation between the nine subdivisions that we have provisionally assumed are after all of an artificial character. We are dealing

[3] A German company, prior to the war, had cut a canal from Lake Beyshehr to Chumla, near Konia, to irrigate a tract of 12,000 square kilometres. See the author's *The War and the Bagdad Railway*, p. 160.

with a continuous stretch of territory, within which neither language nor racial units form sharply marked subdivisions, because of the movements of population that have been going on for many centuries. The subdivisions are suggested by economic and political considerations, rather than on the basis of ethnic predomination, such as is the case in the new states recognized by the Peace Conference in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. In view of this, the contingencies of overlapping and of unnecessary and therefore harmful duplication of efforts tending towards the same end would be far greater, if *each* subdivision were to be handed over to some single mandatory power. We must also reckon with the human element which would lead quite naturally to a hesitation on the part, let us say, of French financiers to aid a scheme the benefits of which would be reaped largely by English merchants, and *vice versa*. The coöperative character of a plan for the resuscitation of the East would be free from

such a factor as political rivalry, and such rivalry is almost inevitable if we emphasize at the start the control of any subdivision by a single Power. International Commissions would combine the advantages of the mandatory principle with an exclusion of the disadvantages. The region might still be subdivided into nine sections, and either each section placed under the tutelage of a commission, or a number combined under a single commission, but in either case the international character of all the commissions would facilitate joint action wherever that would seem advisable. Close communication between the commissions at all times would be an obvious measure, in fact an integral part of the general policy to be pursued. Mutual suspicions would be avoided and political jealousies be reduced to a minimum, because of the representation of the Great Powers and of some of the smaller ones on each commission.

The commercial benefits from the guid-

ance of Eastern lands as here proposed would come to all with sufficient enterprise to avail themselves of the opportunities offered. The competition that would ensue would be healthful because fair. There would be no possibility, and therefore no temptation, for any government to lay or pull wires, with a view of giving its citizens preferential advantages. There would be no tariff wars among the nine subdivisions, nor mutually exclusive legislation—and in this way two of the most fertile factors in breeding distrust among nations would be set aside. In case of difficulties arising, methods of procedure would be simplified by the very circumstance that the Powers interested in the dispute would have their representatives on all the commissions, as against the delays incident to the preliminary diplomatic exchange of communications among the Powers, which would obviously be necessary in the case of each subdivision being placed under separate mandatory control, before an agreement

could be reached or united action be determined upon. The international commissions would naturally form a kind of union among themselves, with perhaps an executive council acting as a medium to consider plans and projects of importance to all. Provision should be made in fact for joint meetings at stated intervals, either of all the commissions, or of representatives chosen from each at stated intervals. Such intercommunication among interrelated commissions would be more likely to ensure harmonious coöperation, than if attempted among mandatory Powers, each disposed to act in its own interest, and with the natural disposition to be jealous of any encroachment on its domain.

A feature of the plan on which stress should be laid is the provision for native representation on each commission, precisely as in the case of many of the international commissions for control of Eastern Europe the interests of the natives are safeguarded by representation. With Armenians on

the international commission for Armenia, with Palestinians and Syrians on the commission or commissions for those lands, with Turks on the commission for Turkish Asia Minor, and so for the other subdivisions, the native point of view and the native interests, as voiced by these representatives, would be brought before the commission in an authoritative and reliable form; and, on the other hand, the confidence of the native population would by their direct participation in the deliberations of the commissions be strengthened and their good will assured. They would feel that they are not being controlled but guided, and that the success of the commissions would be measured by the results of this guidance in the improvement of internal conditions. The moral advantage of native coöperation is a factor of *vital* importance, and this advantage cannot be so readily secured in the case of mandatory control of a district given to one power.

An equally important advantage of international commissions is the elimination of large standing armies of occupation, and with this the removal of the *main* objection urged in this country against American participation in the affairs of the East. With all of the subdivisions of the Near East under the tutelage and supervising control of commissions of an international make-up, there is no need of a large army in Armenia to protect that people against possible attacks from the Turks or from any other quarter, for with the realization of the united strength of all the Powers behind the commissions, who would be in a position to secure the instant support of all in case of necessity, there would be little likelihood of the success of any endeavor to provoke insurrection, or to rouse up one element of the population in the large stretch of territory included in the third region against any other. Such attempts would be nipped in the bud by the certainty of immediate intervention on a large scale.

No prolonged diplomatic negotiations would give agitators the hoped-for opportunity of delay before decisive action could be taken. There would be no weighing of the *pros* and *cons* in case of trouble, to decide whether it is to the interest of any Power to step in. The Powers sharing the responsibility for the maintenance of order would act in unison and without hesitation.

The certainty of united operation of all the Powers would thus act as an effective check in suppressing all sinister attempts that might be made within any of the subdivisions to stir up fanaticism, of which—one must recognize—there is always danger in a Mohammedan population, accustomed to look upon war as a holy crusade. Agitators among the Turks, who have generally been responsible in stirring up their followers in attacks upon the Armenians, could more easily be dealt with if confronted with the united intervention of the great Powers of the world. The testimony of those who have

lived in the East as missionaries, or in some other capacity, is to the effect that Turks and Armenians can live amicably side by side, when the former are not aroused by evilly minded agitators bent upon carrying out designs of their own. Furthermore, the presence of natives on the commissions would be a further effective means of preventing trouble, and in the event of difficulties arising would lend an additional support to the efforts to strike at the cause.

Added to the moral support of the League, there would be throughout the region the visible symbol of the force represented by the countries combining in the constitution of the commissions. With this symbol in constant evidence, a small force, made up of contingents from the Powers represented in the commissions, would suffice for policing all parts of the region thus committed to a combined tutelage. The organization of native militia under the charge of the military experts on the commissions could be

undertaken without delay and with perfect safety—all the more so because of the confidence inspired by the presence of natives on the commissions.

Mandates, as has been pointed out, would not eliminate political rivalries among the Powers entrusted with them. Under a mandate system it is not beyond the realm of contingency to have a crisis in which we would find one standing army pitted against another, whereas with all the great Powers represented on the commissions and backed by the moral force of the League of Nations, to whom the commissions would be directly responsible, such a contingency could hardly arise. Disputes that might occur within or among the subdivisions would necessarily be settled by the commissions. The absence of large standing armies would facilitate such settlement, because the constitution of the commissions would eliminate the *threat* of force on the part of any one commission against the other, or even on the part of any

single commissioner, since the country which he represents is pledged to international co-operation as the sole basis of action. No single Power *could* act arbitrarily under such circumstances, for the simple reason that it could not act alone. It is not, of course, assumed that under a system of international commissions difficult and critical situations will not occur, but only that the likelihood is diminished because of the removal of irritating factors, and that when they do arise they can be dealt with more rapidly, because of the direct participation of all the Powers represented on the commissions. The absence of large standing armies would of itself remove any temptation to extend the guardianship to a permanent protectorate with the possibility of ultimate proprietorship, which we have seen is an inherent danger in the mandatory system.

The single *goal* of the commissions would be to pave the way for handing over the government of each of the subdivisions to the

people. The attainment of that goal would be more rapidly achieved in some cases than in others, just as the character of the guardianship exercised by the commissions would vary, according to different conditions, the intelligence of the population in any district, and their capacity for self-government, which in most cases would for many years be limited to local affairs. A people like the Armenians do not really need a mandate. They are able to govern themselves, and indeed they have in the past supplied the Turkish Empire with some of its most capable administrators. Since they secured their independence they have shown their capacity for organization and self-government, and have among other things done much to establish a general system of education according to modern methods. What Armenia needs is financial aid and guidance for a time in establishing a sound and fair system of taxation. They need the services of Western trained engineers in building and improving

roads; they need perhaps also economic and industrial experts to assist in building up certain industries. On the other hand, in Turkish Asia Minor a much more elaborate kind of tutelage is required, for here the commissions will be dealing with a population that needs to be educated in the first elements of self-government. The Mohammedan opposition to modern educational methods will have to be overcome. The correction of century-old abuses which have sapped the moral fibre of the population and made them an easy prey to sinister influences will be a task that will test the calibre as well as the tact of the commissioners. The whole country, with the exception of the coast land where the Greeks have displayed their talents for business enterprises with the improvements that follow, will need to be built up as it were from the foundation. That will be the work of many years, perhaps of generations. It is too large a task to be undertaken by any single Power, and at all events

a reasonable view of the situation suggests that it can be far better done by international coöperation.

The problems in the newly formed Arab state are again of an entirely different order, for here we will be dealing with large numbers of Bedouins and other loosely organized tribes, each jealous of its own liberties and having little in common with dwellers in towns and villages. Large tracts of Arabia are in the same condition as they were in pre-Islamic days. The sense of national cohesiveness which Mohammed and his successors were able to inspire in rallying the Arab tribes around the standard of Allah has long since been lost. The Turks were never able to exercise any firm control over central and southern Arabia, and now that even the shadow of Turkish sovereignty has disappeared one may question whether a made-to-order king of Hedjaz will be able to unite Arabia under his sceptre. There are portions of Arabia which are entirely unexplored. No

European traveller has as yet succeeded in traversing the Peninsula from the coast of the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf. Few have escaped with their lives who ventured to do what that remarkable English traveller, Charles Doughty, accomplished some decades ago when he spent several years exploring northern Arabia.[4] If Arabia is to be redeemed from the blight which affects large portions of it, it can only be by international coöperation. Even less than in the case of Turkish Asia Minor could any single Power, entrusted with a mandate, be equal to the task, even if it were willing to undertake it.

For countries like Palestine and Syria where the problems are of a particularly delicate character, because of the sacred character of the land, and further complicated by the unfriendly feelings between Christians, Mohammedans and Jews, international com-

[4] The results of his observations and important investigations are embodied in his two volumes, *Arabia Deserta* (Oxford, 1888), perhaps the most remarkable work of travel in modern times.

missions would be particularly appropriate. Indeed, Palestine and Syria ought not to be separated at all from one another, for there is no natural boundary between them, but only a purely artificial line of demarcation. The only reason why it is proposed to divide this section among two mandates is because France does not favor giving the control of the whole to Great Britain. Just here we have an illustration of the inherent weakness of the mandate system as now proposed. Great Britain is the logical candidate as the mandatory Power for Palestine, not because she particularly wishes to take the tutelage for the Palestinians, but because the control of Palestine is essential to her. The motive is political, just as in the case of Syria, France's desire—and a perfectly natural one —to have the mandate for this section is because of her interests in that region. Now Great Britain's position in Egypt would be just as well protected if Palestine were placed in the hands of an international com-

mission on which she would be represented, and the interests of France would be just as effectively safeguarded if that same commission on which she would likewise be represented were to be entrusted with the tutelage also for Syria. Or, if for the sake of expediency, it should be found desirable to have two separate commissions, the recognition of Great Britain's special interest in Palestine might be accomplished by making the British representative the chairman of the commission, and giving to the French representative the same distinction on the commission for Syria.

All the splendid plans that Great Britain has in mind for Palestine, and which she has already begun to carry out, can be accomplished just as well, and even better, in cooperation, with the other Powers represented on an international commission for that land, and with their good will; and France could assuredly demonstrate her ability in promoting the interests of Syria with equal success

if this country were to be placed in the hands of the same commission, or *if you choose,* of a separate commission. With Palestine and Syria in the hands of an international commission the fear of the native Mohammedans that Palestine would some day be converted into a Jewish State with the approval of the Western Powers would disappear, for an international commission would of sheer necessity be actuated by the principle, fundamental to modern democracy, that a country belongs to *all* the people who live in it, not to the majority nor to the minority. The obvious result of an international commission would be to create a Palestinian and Syrian State. The agitation of the political Zionists for a Jewish *national* centre would cease, and Zionism would find its legitimate field in promoting the welfare of the Jewish colonies in Palestine without the introduction of any ulterior political aim—which is a veritable firebrand in its capability for mischief and for keeping alive religious hostili-

ties. Great Britain's claim that she cannot afford to see the Persian Gulf in the hands of any European Power because of the ultimate danger to her possessions in India would certainly be compatible with the control of Mesopotamia by a commission composed of representatives of France and the United States as well as herself, and possibly of other countries, besides the native representation. Under such conditions it would manifestly be impossible for any European Power ever to obtain possession of the Persian Gulf; and as a further guarantee, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria might be stamped as neutralized lands *in perpetuum* by the League of Nations with its invincible backing to support such neutralization.

Let me add that it is not necessary under the plan here proposed that there should be an international commission for *each* one of the nine subdivisions into which Asia Minor and its outposts may be divided. In fact, one of the advantages of the plan is that it affords

the possibility of having a single control for Turkish Asia Minor and Armenia; and this single commission might even include under its tutelage the Georgian Republic and Azerbeijan, though it might, on the other hand, be more feasible to have two commissions, one for Turkish Asia Minor and the other for Georgia, Armenia and Azerbeijan. Such questions can only be determined after careful investigation of local conditions. Mesopotamia for obvious reasons should have its own commission, and so should Arabia. If we therefore combine Palestine and Syria, we would have four, or at the most, five commissions to cover the entire region.

Lastly, the plan of international commissions would solve the perplexing problem of what to do with Constantinople. To give it to Greece which has, from the point of view of the traditional diplomatic policy of Europe, more of a claim to it than any other Power, would arouse the opposition of the

Balkan States and perhaps also of Italy. Great Britain does not wish to see France placed in control of it, assuming that France would accept it, and it is said that Great Britain now prefers to leave Constantinople in the hands of the Turks—a plan favored also by France—for fear of arousing discontent among the Mohammedans of India by driving the Turk out of it. The Turks are certainly justified in not desiring to be driven out nor need they be, but what needs to be done, in order to ensure the peace of the world, is that they should be deprived of the *control* of that splendid and historic metropolis. Does not the logic of the situation again point with special pertinence to an international commission as the obvious solution? Under such a commission, which should include Greek and Turkish representation, Constantinople would naturally become a "Free City," as Danzig, because of its position as an outlet for Poland and Germany to the Baltic, has been made a Free City

by the Peace Conference. Constantinople would thus retain her predominant position as the gate leading from the Black Sea to the Ægean, without arousing fears and jealousies if that strategic port were in the hands of any single Power, no matter which. It was ever the fear of Constantinople falling into the hands of Russia that led Great Britain and France to come to the support of Turkey, although both realized that the dissolution of the Turkish Empire was inevitable and that her promises of reforms in her corrupt administration, so ruinous to the peoples of the Near East, were absolutely worthless. They probably could not have been carried out even if Turkey had willed to do so. It was in the hope of making herself mistress of the East by holding Constantinople as the key in her hands that led Russia to become the supporter of the Balkan States in their efforts towards regaining their independence. The failure of Great Britain and France in their policy, as Russia's failure

to achieve her ambition, may be regarded as the verdict of history in condemnation of the principle of European diplomacy which guided all three Powers. Germany, bent on following along the same lines in planning her ambitious scheme, was likewise doomed to a failure which involved her own sad downfall from the magnificent position that she held only a few years ago.

With Constantinople in the hands of any European Power, the Near East would continue to be a menace to the world. Can there be a more effective way of disposing of this menace than by declaring the city, with a small area about it, to be neutralized territory, and Constantinople itself open to all and under an administration in which all the Great Powers would share the responsibility as well as the guarantee for her maintenance as a great international port, and as one of the centres of commerce for the entire East. In the case of Constantinople the common form of government would probably have to

be made perpetual; but this would not be in violation of the principle underlying the proposed plan for the solution of the Near-Eastern problem, for Constantinople has always had an international character. It has for many centuries been a great gathering place for all the nations of the East with many representatives also of the peoples of the West. Greeks have been as large a factor in making the city what it is as Turks. There is no infringement, therefore, on specific national rights in giving to the international character of the place an international form of government. The Turks in Asia Minor do not *need* Constantinople in order to be trained to self-government—a process which, as indicated, will be a very slow one. There will be no encroachment on the Turkish national spirit by leaving the Turks who will remain in Constantinople unmolested, enjoying the same protection as all other inhabitants and with the same opportunities in the commercial race.

I have reserved for the close an argument in favor of the plan here proposed for the solution of the Eastern Question which especially concerns us in this country. I have spoken of America's interest in the Near East because of the significant educational work she has carried on there for more than half a century. That work will go on and we are, therefore, directly concerned in the disposition to be made of Constantinople, Asia Minor, Syria and Palestine. I have referred to the strong sympathy felt in this country for Armenia, as manifested by the aid furnished her and which is still flowing liberally, and by the sending of special commissions to investigate and report on what can further be done in order to help Armenia to recover from the staggering blows she received at various periods during the war. We cannot be indifferent to the future fate of Armenia. The bond which ties us to that country will never be severed. I have also spoken at the beginning of this study of the

Eastern Question of the feeling prevailing in Great Britain, France, Italy and indeed throughout Europe, that the great work of reconstruction which confronts the world in Europe and in the Near East cannot be carried on without our coöperation. It is not for the purpose of dragging us into a trap, or from the purely selfish desire to have some of our wealth, that the great and small Powers of Europe are urging our participation in the endeavor to settle the affairs of the Near East. It is because the peoples of Europe know that we are free from any ambition for territorial expansion and that we are beyond suspicion of desiring to extend our political control. For these reasons confidence is felt in our ability to obtain the goodwill of the peoples of the East.

The extraordinary reception which President Wilson received on his first visit to European capitals was an expression of this confidence. He was hailed as a liberator, who was to help inaugurate a new era that

would apply new methods to the solution of old problems; and I feel convinced that, despite errors that may have been made by him and despite defects in the treaties negotiated, the verdict of history will do justice to President Wilson's share in bringing about a signal advance in dealing with the complicated questions that confronted the Peace Conference. Not all has been gained that was hoped for, but something has been gained, and, in the opinion of many, much has been gained. The gain does not represent a personal triumph, but the triumph of the political ideals for which this great democracy stands. The famous "Fourteen Points" may fairly be regarded as giving voice to these ideals, applied to the solution of international problems.

Ideals are set up, not in expectation of their immediate realization but as sign-posts to point the direction in which we should be moving. The "Fourteen Points" should be looked upon as a declaration of the new prin-

ciples that are to guide nations in their relations to one another, but the execution of these principles, it should also be recognized, must necessarily be a slow and gradual process.

The strong opposition in this country against taking a mandate for any Eastern country, does not mean that America is not willing to lend a helping hand in the East or elsewhere. The opposition to mandates in this country is more than counterbalanced by the sense of responsibility, engendered by the war and strengthened since the close of the war, towards those who have suffered more than we have in the cause for which all were fighting, and who now need our help. If that help can be given without the two contingencies that now hold us back—political complications and the dispatching of a large army across the sea—public opinion in this country would approve of plans that might eventually lead to the resuscitation of the East. The plan here

proposed is free from the objections inherent in the proposal to have a series of mandatory Powers for the Near East. International commissions embody the correct principle of trusteeship underlying mandates, without risking that principle through accompanying political complications and contingencies almost inseparable from mandates, chosen because of some ulterior political or other consideration.

We may go a step further and say that for this country to step out of participation in reconstructing Europe and in revivifying the East, when it can be done without a sacrifice of our national traditions and without involving sacrifice of American lives, would be an act of extreme selfishness, unworthy of these traditions. Moreover, we would risk the loss of whatever advance has been made by the work of the Peace Conference. There would be great danger, if we stepped out, of a relapse on the part of European Powers into the former methods of trying to main-

tain the peace of the world by alliances and counter-alliances, and by a policy towards the East dictated not from considerations for the rights of peoples or for the "idea of public right," as Gladstone put it, but with a view of maintaining a "balance of power," which has always in the past led to an upset of the balance itself. Without our participation in maintaining the new guiding principle to train the peoples of the East to self-government, mandates will be apt to shade over into protectorates, and the trusteeship become a flimsy disguise for proprietorship. That, to judge from the experience of the past, will be the alternative if we allow the European Powers to have a free hand in the Near East. In saying this it is not by any means implied that all the European Powers are inspired by imperialistic ambitions, or that any of them is actuated by sinister motives, but Europe *as a whole* is wedded to its traditional diplomatic policy; and since all Powers have at one time or another played the same game,

no single one is in a position to interpose an objection against any one that may be disposed to play that game—except by the threat of force which would mean more wars. There can be little doubt that Europeans —viewed as a whole—would feel immensely relieved to *have the game stopped,* but it is almost inconceivable that this can be done without American influence. Her presence on international commissions would act as a deterrent against the relapse into the old methods; her participation in the work of these commissions, which would be wholly constructive and free from ulterior political designs, would ensure the permanence of the new guiding principle for which the world is now ripe.

It will be said that this picture of conditions under international commissions is of too rosy a hue, that it suggests a pipe dream of a diplomatic millenium that may bear little resemblance to the real results that will follow when commissions, composed of repre-

sentatives of different nationalities with different, if not conflicting motives, get together to regulate the affairs of a territory foreign to all. It has been argued that international commissions when tried have not been an unqualified success; and if, in answer, one points to the international commission for the regulation of the traffic on the Danube and its tributaries which *has* been a success, one is told that this is an exception. Why an exception? Would it not be more pertinent to inquire why the other commissions have failed, though it should be added that the Danube commission by no means stands out alone as a success. If this investigation were carried on, it would be found that the time-honored, old-fashioned diplomatic policy which has now gone bankrupt was responsible for the failure, through the infusion of the specific interests of some particular power vitiating the efforts of coöperation. The *conditio sine quâ non* for trying the new experiment of international commis-

sions in settling the Eastern Question is the whole-souled willingness of the great Powers to abandon all ambitions for extension of territorial sovereignty over lands which do not belong to any of them. Without this preliminary condition international commissions will unquestionably fail. They will fail as definitely as the old policy of the exploitation of the East has failed to settle the Eastern Question and only succeeded in creating new complications. To ensure the fulfillment of the necessary condition there is, so far as one can see, only one certain guarantee—our coöperation in the activities of these commissions. One may assert this with a certain amount of assurance, because the four treaties drawn up at Paris have recognized the need and value of the international spirit by providing for a large number of international commissions. All that is needed, therefore, is to strengthen this spirit, to make it a permanent gain by giving to it our active endorsement.

Finally, our own interests—to place the whole subject on a lower scale—demand our participation in the work of making the victory gained on the battle-fields a permanent one. We should ask ourselves whether we can afford to step aside before the purpose for which we entered the war has been achieved. Ought we not rather to say, with the workingman of the famous poster, "Sure, we'll finish the job"? Of what avail the sacrifices that the war has entailed, if we now content ourselves with merely making peace with Germany? It may be said without exaggeration that the situation in the East is more serious at the present time than when the war broke out. We do not need the East, but the East needs us. We may be able to get along perfectly well without a League of Nations, but there can be no effective League, essential as a factor in applying the new principles to the East, without our active coöperation. The basic thought of the League of Nations is an expression of the

American spirit. It reflects the international spirit, the application of which to the Eastern Question I am urging. The movement for a League of Nations gained its greatest force in this country during the war, *because* it was so distinctly an American conception. It was precisely because of the impetus that the movement had acquired in this country that the plan was presented at Paris and made an integral part of the treaty itself. We may grant that the wording requires clarification, but is it not fair to ask that the constitution of the League should be judged by the *spirit* that pervades it?

It has been pertinently said that the Constitution of the United States—hailed as one of the greatest documents ever produced as the fruit of a single deliberating body—was soon found to require amendment, and has been frequently amended and no doubt will be further amended. And yet it has been a successful experiment. The League of Nations contains so much that is good, that

there is no reason to fear further amendment of it as well as clarification, through action by the League itself. It was American advocacy of the League that finally overcame the indifference which it first encountered in official circles in England and France, and in view of this it is hardly conceivable that an instrument, devised for the spread of the American idea of settling international problems, should be a menace to our own sovereignty. It is strange that while the enthusiasm for the League as a way out should have grown in Europe, in this country, after its adoption by the European Powers, strenuous efforts should have been directed to chilling our ardor for a plan which, granting its human imperfections, is the only solution, as yet proposed, to prevent conflicts from assuming international proportions. The League of Nations needs us because we stand for the new guiding principle, which in the form of international commissions can be applied to the Eastern

Question—as an experiment, if you choose, but with a reasonable hope of its furnishing a solution and with a certainty of its making, at the very least, a constructive contribution towards such a solution.

It is not *merely* a question of deviating from our established traditions of non-interference with European or Eastern politics, but also of preventing a repetition of the disastrous failure of the old-world policy in constantly interfering, in a spirit of imperialistic ambition, with that resurrection of the East which is clearly the only way of solving the Eastern Question. The East has languished for centuries under Turkish misrule. Its former glory departed as a result of the wretched conditions brought about through the control of the Turkish Empire. Once the source and inspiration of Western civilization, the exhausted and devitalized East makes its appeal to the progressive West to come to its rescue in helping it to play the rôle which distinguished it in ancient

history and up to the time of the Crusades. The triumph of the Crescent over the Cross at the end of the thirteenth century led directly to the formation of the huge Turkish Empire and marked the beginning of the decline of the East. Let us remember that it is to the East that we owe three-fourths of all the religion that there is in the world. The East has given us our alphabet and the decorative arts and much of our architecture, and it has been the chief stimulus in the unfolding of literature in the West. The chief contributions of the West have been in the domain of science, but the substratum of culture—moral enthusiasm, romanticism and the firing of the imagination—are the legacies of the ancient East. Even Greek culture is erected on a basis of an older Eastern civilization. What the East once was, it can again become through the infusion of the new life that can be brought to it from the West. The East needs us, but there is a sense in which we also need the

East, for progress in the world has always been brought about through the interchange of Eastern and Western ideas and inspirations. Through the achievements of Western science East and West have been brought into still closer intimacy in our days, and this process is destined to go on. The solution of the Eastern Question—if it is capable of solution—is therefore of importance to the West, as much as to the East.

Once more, then, we cannot step out at this critical juncture because the war did not terminate with the signing of the armistice, nor does it terminate even with the signing of the treaties with Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. The most vital struggle still lies before us, the determination of the future of the lands which before the war were still under Turkish control, and which now have been released from that yoke. The war is not over as long as the Eastern Question has not been disposed of. We cannot quit now without risking, aye, sacrificing,

what has been gained during the prolonged struggle against Germany. We cannot quit without losing a great opportunity that has come to us through the indispensable aid that our armies rendered to the almost exhausted hosts of the Allies, or, to urge a more selfish reason, we cannot quit because the danger that led us into the war still confronts the world as long as the Eastern Question remains as a smoldering firebrand.

The alternative to making the renewed attempt with American coöperation towards the solution of the Eastern Question by the application of a new principle is the prospect of further international conflicts into which we may be drawn, as we were drawn into the war of 1914. Neither our established traditions nor our strong desire to maintain our political isolation were able to resist the stronger current which swept us into the stream. That current is still flowing. As long as the Eastern Question, with its constant menace and its contingencies, imminent

and remote, confronts the world, we may cry "Peace, Peace;" but with the ancient prophet, we will be forced to admit, "There is no peace."

The old methods of preserving peace have failed. Let us try the new ones. Let us remove the greatest menace to world-peace by placing the old East under a genuine tutelage of the new West, not a sham pretense of trusteeship but a genuine one, based on the spirit of international coöperation, which won the war and which alone can insure the fruits of victory.

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